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Summary 
When the Torrey Canyon ran aground in 1967, there was no international 
regime covering liability for oil pollution damage. This changed with the 
adoption of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention for Oil Pollution (CLC) and 
the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Convention). 
While torts are mainly fault based, the Conventions apply strict liability for 
the shipowner. The CLC/Fund is a two-tiered regime where liability is 
established through the CLC and if certain criteria are met, the Fund will 
further compensate victims of oil pollution damage, assuming a state is 
party to both Conventions. A state may be party only to the CLC but in 
order to be party to the Fund, it must also be party to the CLC. In 1992 the 
Conventions were amended, although some states are still party to the 
1969/1971 regime. A third tier of compensation is available for contracting 
States of the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. There was still a gap in 
the regime of liability for oil pollution damage, as the CLC did not deal with 
bunker spills from non tankers. This gap was filled by the 2001 International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (Bunkers).  
 
In the thesis, the author strives to delve into two problems related to the 
definition of “pollution damage” in the Conventions; those of 
“environmental damage” and “pure economic loss”. The legislators of the 
Conventions have left matters such as standing (locus standi) and 
compensability of pure economic loss to the discretion of national courts. 
This has led to uncertainty and a lack of harmonization within the regime of 
oil pollution damage. Although the Fund has developed certain guidelines to 
deal with the discrepancy of judgments rendered in courts of contracting 
States, judges have generally been of the position that the guidelines of the 
Fund are not legally binding.  
Uniformity will consequently be difficult to achieve unless the definition in 
the Conventions is changed. 
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Sammanfattning 
När Torrey Canyon gick på grund 1967, fanns det ingen internationell regim 
som täcker ansvar för föroreningsskador från olja. Domstolar vid tidpunkten 
var tvungna att förlita sig på nationell rätt. Detta kom att ändras i och med 
antagandet av 1969 ansvarighetskonventionen för oljeutsläpp och 1971 års 
konvention om upprättandet av en internationell fond för ersättning av skada 
orsakad av förorening genom olja. Konventionerna ålägger strikt ansvar för 
redaren. Konventionerna är uppbyggda så att ansvaret är ålagt genom 
ansvarighetskonvention, och om vissa kriterier är uppfyllda, kommer fonden 
ytterligare kompensera offer för oljeutsläpp, förutsatt att en stat har tillträtt 
båda konventionerna. Dessa ändrades 1992, även om vissa stater fortfarande 
är parter i den gamla regimen. En tredje grupp av ersättningen är tillgänglig 
för stater vilka är part i 2003 års fondprotokoll. Det var fortfarande ett hål i 
systemet för skadeståndsansvar gällande föroreningsskador för oljeutsläpp 
då ansvarighetskonvention endast behandlar tankfartyg och därför icke 
bunkerolja från exempelvis lastfartyg.  Denna brist avhjälptes genom 2001 
års konvention om ansvarighet och ersättning för skada genom förorening 
orsakad av bunkerolja.  
 
I examensarbetet strävar författaren efter att gräva i två problem relaterade 
till definitionen av "skada genom förorening" i konventionerna; nämligen 
"miljöskador" och "ren förmögenhetsskada". Lagstiftarna till 
konventionerna har lämnat frågor som talerätt och kompensation för ren 
förmögenhetsskada till nationella domstolar att avgöra. Detta har lett till 
osäkerhet och brist på harmonisering inom regimen av 
oljeföroreningsskador. Även om fonden har utvecklat vissa riktlinjer för att 
ta itu med diskrepansen av domar som meddelats i domstolar i 
avtalsslutande stater, har domare i allmänhet hävdat att riktlinjerna för 
fonden inte är juridiskt bindande. 
Enhetlighet kommer följaktligen att bli svårt att uppnå om inte definitionen i 
konventionerna ändras. 
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Abbreviations  
 
CLC  Civil Liability Convention  
CMI   Comité Maritime International  
CRISTAL  Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker 
Liability of Oil Pollution 
HNS  Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
IMCO  Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative  
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IMO  International Maritime Organization 
IOPC   International Oil Pollution Compensation 
LLMC  Convention on Limitation of Liability for  
Maritime Claims  
OPA 90  Oil Pollution Act 1990 
SDR  Special Drawing Rights  
TOVALOP  Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement 
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution 
UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
While today, the subject of oil pollution damage is one of the major 
concerns in shipping, this was not always the case. While there were certain 
ways of dealing with liability, e.g. torts, there were no conventions relating 
to the subject and few put much thought into the creation of an international 
regime regulating liability. 
However, with the emergence of the supertanker in the late 50’s, an accident 
of huge proportions was bound to happen. 
 
On 18 March 1967, the Torrey Canyon struck Pollard’s Rock on Seven 
Stones reef between the Cornish coastline and the Isle of Scilly. The ship 
carried 120,000 tonnes of crude oil and contaminated not only large parts of 
the Cornish coast but thousands of tonnes were carried by winds and 
currents towards France. At the time, it was the biggest oil spill ever and 
there was little experience in dealing with oil pollution of this magnitude.  
As a consequence, the damage done to the environment was massive which 
raised many issues concerning liability and compensation for pollution 
damage.
1
  
The accident was on the high seas; the ship was registered in Liberia but 
owned by a company in Bermuda. There were charterers and sub-charterers, 
damage was done in both the UK and France, two states with completely 
different limits to liability. Further, there was the issue of who should be 
able to obtain compensation. 
The claims were eventually settled but it was clear that an international 
convention was required for oil pollution to be dealt with effectively.  
Work began immediately to establish a regime relating to liability and 
compensation for oil pollution damage, resulting in the 1969 Civil Liability 
Convention for Oil Pollution (CLC), followed by the 1971 Fund 
Convention.  
                                                 
1
 Edgar Gold, “Pollution of the Sea and International Law: A Canadian Perspective”, in 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Volume 3 1971-72, p. 21-22. 
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The current regimes regulating oil pollution are the CLC 1992 (although the 
1969 Convention is still in force in a number of states), the Fund 
Convention 1992 (along with the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol) and 
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage (Bunkers).  
 
While these conventions provide the foundation for oil pollution liability, 
there are still some issues that have remained unresolved. This thesis will 
provide, inter alia, a background to liability for oil pollution damage, 
through national legislation and the CLC/Fund regime. The focus will be on 
two specific problems with the current regime: the issue of compensability 
of pure economic losses and; the issue of what constitutes and relates to 
“environmental damage”.  
 
The terms responsibility and liability will be used interchangeably 
throughout the paper but what it means is the act or omission that leads to a 
legal consequence. However, it should be mentioned that “duty” does not 
necessarily connote legal consequence. Likewise, the terms recoverable and 
compensable in relation to pure economic loss will be used interchangeably.  
 
1.2 Purpose of thesis 
The purpose of the thesis is to give the reader an overview of ship-source oil 
pollution liability and compensation before moving on to address two 
problems where there is quite a bit of uncertainty; environmental damage 
and compensation for pure economic loss.  
As a definition of environmental damage is lacking in the CLC/Fund regime 
the author will attempt to give an analysis as to what kind of damage is 
compensable and who has the right to make a claim. 
The chapter on pure economic loss attempts to give the reader a grasp of the 
concept itself and look at when these losses are compensable under national 
legislation and the relevant Conventions. The role of the IOPC Fund in 
determining compensability will also be explored.  
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1.3 Delimitations 
The discussion is confined to consideration of ship-source pollution from 
oil, both cargo and fuel but will not deal with chemicals, referred to as 
“hazardous and noxious substances” (HNS). Further, industry based 
agreements such as TOVALOP and CRISTAL will not be dealt with. 
The United States Oil Pollution Act 90 (OPA 90) will be mentioned in terms 
of comparison with the CLC/Fund but will not be analyzed further.  
Although the paper will look into the CLC/Fund regime, there will not be 
enough space to give a very detailed analysis.  
1.4 Methodology  
The methodology used by the author is the traditional legal method and the 
sources used are mainly literature, case law, conventions and national 
legislation. Some chapters are more descriptive providing the necessary 
background to the problems on which the author has decided to focus. In the 
more “problematic” chapters a more analytical approach has been taken by 
using case law and scholarly writings. 
 
1.5 Disposition 
The first part of the thesis is designated to giving a background of liability 
for ship-source oil pollution damage. The second part deals with the two 
problems this author chosen to focus on: environmental damage and pure 
economic loss. 
The concept of pure economic loss will be dealt with at first in a general 
way, giving background to the problem and a small comparative analysis 
and then move into pure economic loss in relation to ship-source oil 
pollution and the Fund’s position. 
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2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In Article 235 (3) UNCLOS it is stated that: 
With the objective of assuring prompt and adequate compensation in 
respect of all damage caused by pollution of the marine 
environment, States shall cooperate in the implementation of 
existing international law and the further development of 
international law relating to responsibility and liability for the 
assessment of and compensation for damage and the settlement of 
related disputes, as well as, where appropriate, development of 
criteria and procedures for payment of adequate compensation, such 
as compulsory insurance or compensation funds. 
 
The provision shows the importance of compensation for oil pollution 
damage. It makes clear that compensation must be prompt and adequate and 
forms along with the well established principle of making the “polluter pay” 
a foundation for liability and compensation for pollution damage. 
There are different systems in establishing liability. While it is, of course, 
easier where states are parties to conventions such as the CLC, this is not 
always the case and then alternative methods of establishing liability are 
required. 
 
2.1 Law of Torts 
While the UK is now party to the CLC, there have been accidents causing 
pollution damage that predate the convention. The alternative was then to 
found liability on some type of tort, as oil pollution damage is essentially a 
tort, the relevant torts being: negligence, nuisance and trespass. This would 
be the situation today if there was no convention or if the oil spill occurred 
in a common law state which is not party to the convention. 
Perhaps the most commonly used tort in cases of pollution is that of 
negligence. Negligence is “the breach of a legal duty to take care which 
results in damage, undesired by the defendant to the plaintiff.”2 
                                                 
2
 W.V.H  Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (18th edition, London: Sweet & Maxell, 
2010), p. 150.  
 11 
It was further stated by Lord Wright in Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co. v. 
Mcmullan
3
 that- 
negligence means more than heedless or careless conduct, 
whether in omission or commission: it properly connotes the 
complex concept of duty, breach, and damage thereby suffered 
by the person to whom the duty was owing
4
 
 
Regarding trespass, it can be said that “any direct interference with land in 
the possession of another is trespass and is actionable per se.”5 In Fowler v. 
Lanning it was held that-  
trespass to the person did not lie if the injury to the plaintiff 
was caused unintentionally and without negligence on the 
defendant's part, and this applied whether the injury was 
caused on the highway or in any other place.
6
 
 
Nuisance can be categorized into private and public nuisance.  
In the case of Attorney General v. PYA Quarries Ltd (No.1)
7
 it was held 
that- 
…any nuisance which materially affected the reasonable comfort 
and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty's subjects was a 
public nuisance.
8
 
Private nuisance is referred to as “unlawful interference with a person’s use 
or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it.”9 
A somewhat recent case relating to pollution and nuisance is that of the 
Cambridge Water.
10
 The defendant ran a tanning business; certain 
chemicals used in the process entered the water supply, contaminating a 
borehole recently purchased by the plaintiff in 1976.  
                                                 
3
 [1934] A.C. 1. 
4
 Ibid, p.25. 
5
 Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law 
(7th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 401. 
6
 [1959] 1 Q.B. 426. 
7
 [1957] 2 Q.B. 169. 
8
 Ibid, p. 170. 
9
 Rogers, supra n. 2, p. 712. 
10
 [1994] 2 A.C. 264. 
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At that time a small amount of contamination was not considered to be 
significant but in 1980 Directive 80/778/EEC was issued with stricter 
guidelines regarding water supplies. Consequently the well became 
worthless and the plaintiff claimed for compensation.  
In the House of Lords, this was rejected due to the injury being 
unforeseeable.
11
  
 
2.1.1 Esso Petroleum & Wagon Mound (No. 2) 
Before the CLC came into force, two cases relating to oil pollution damage 
were decided in the House of Lords.  
In the case of Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum
12
 the defendant’s 
steamship Inverpool stranded due to a defect in the steering gear and 
proceeded to jettison 400 tons of oil. The oil polluted the plaintiff’s 
foreshore causing damage to property, consequently the plaintiff claimed for 
damages due to negligence and/or nuisance and/or trespass.  
In the first instance it was held by Devlin J. that- 
…plaintiffs had established a good cause of action in nuisance (or in 
nuisance analogous to trespass) in that their property was 
sufficiently proximate to the navigable highway to be affected by 
the misuse of it, but that being proximate to the highway they took 
the risk of damage being done to their property by users of the 
highway acting with due care, and that the onus was on plaintiffs to 
prove negligence (and not on defendants to prove inevitable 
accident); that the stranding occurred owing to a defect in the ship's 
steering gear, such defect being caused by an unexplained fracture 
of the stern frame; that the only negligence alleged by plaintiffs was 
the negligence of the master, and that, the master having satisfied 
the Court that he was not personally negligent, the action failed.
13
 
 
This decision was reversed in the Court of Appeal where it was held that- 
…in the circumstances of the stranding the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applied and the onus was on defendants to show that the 
                                                 
11
 Ibid, p. 301. 
12
 [1955] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 655. 
13
 [1953] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 414. 
 13 
fracture of the stern frame occurred without negligence on their part 
(or at any rate to provide a reasonable explanation consistent with 
negligence or no negligence), and that having failed to do so they 
were liable to plaintiffs in negligence
14
 
It was further held by Denning L.J. that there were grounds for an action in 
public nuisance: 
Applying the old cases to modern instances, it is, in my opinion, a 
public nuisance to discharge oil into the sea in such circumstances 
that it is likely to be carried on to the shores and beaches of our land 
to the prejudice and discomfort of Her Majesty's subjects. It is an 
offence punishable by the common law. Furthermore, if any person 
should suffer greater damage or inconvenience from the oil than the 
generality of the public, he can have an action to recover damages 
on that account, provided, of course, that he can discover the 
offender who discharged the oil.
15
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeal rested largely on the decision in The 
Merchant Prince
16
, where counsel for the appellants contended that the onus 
was upon the defendants in the action to prove inevitable accident
17
, citing a 
passage in The Merchant Prince: 
The burden rests on the defendants to shew inevitable accident. To 
sustain that the defendants must do one or other of two things. They 
must either shew what was the cause of the accident, and shew that 
the result of that cause was inevitable; or they must shew all the 
possible causes, one or other of which produced the effect, and must 
further shew with regard to every one of these possible causes that 
the result could not have been avoided.
18
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 [1954] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 446. 
15
 Ibid, p. 456. 
16
 [1892] p. 179. 
17
 Supra n. 12, p. 665. 
18
 [1892] p. 179, p. 189. 
 14 
In the House of Lords the issue was that of negligence and not nuisance or 
trespass as the discharge of oil was necessary for the safety of the crew and 
this afforded a sufficient answer to the claim based upon nuisance or 
trespass. 19 
 
Lord Morton of Henryton held in regards to the pleadings that-  
As against the master, it was alleged that he had been negligent, that 
his negligence was the cause of the discharge of oil from the tanker, 
that such discharge had resulted in "a trespass and/or nuisance" and 
had caused damage to the respondents. It was sought to make the 
appellants liable only on the ground of vicarious responsibility for 
the acts and defaults of the master. 
  
All the attacks upon the master's conduct were fought out before 
Devlin, J., and they all failed. The victory of the master destroyed 
the only ground upon which the respondents by their statement of 
claim had sought to cast liability upon the appellants. Counsel for 
the respondents then sought to make a case of which no hint 
appeared in the pleadings.
20
 
His Lordship further added that- 
The respondents, however, as I have already pointed out, had 
pleaded negligence of the master, and trespass and nuisance and 
damage resulting from such negligence; as against the appellants, 
they chose to rely only upon the responsibility of the owners for the 
master's negligence. 
In this state of the pleadings it seems to me to follow that the Court 
of Appeal, having affirmed the judgment of Devlin, J., in favour of 
the master and having thereby acquitted the master of any 
negligence, should also have affirmed his judgment in favour of the 
present appellants.
21
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Supra n. 12, p. 661. 
20
 Ibid, p. 665. 
21
 Ibid. 
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This was the reasoning behind the House of Lords reversing the judgment 
made in the Court of Appeal. However, it would appear that if the plaintiff 
had in the pleadings alleged that not only the master but also the owners of 
the ship were negligent the outcome may very well have been different and  
the rule in The Merchant Prince would have applied.   
In addition Lord Tucker held regarding the relationship between negligence 
and trespass that: 
[I]t is in my view well settled that in actions between users of the 
highway, and between the occupier of premises adjoining the 
highway which have been damaged by a person lawfully using the 
highway, the person who has suffered damage cannot recover in 
trespass in the absence of negligence on the part of the person who 
has caused the damage.
22
 
 
The other major case relating to oil which predates the CLC is that of The 
Wagon Mound (No. 2).
23
  
While bunkering in Sydney Harbour, a large quantity of furnace oil was 
spilled from the vessel Wagon Mound. The oil on the water became ignited, 
causing damage to the vessels Corrimal and Audrey D. In the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales it was held that the appellant (the owners of 
Wagon Wound) was liable in nuisance but not in negligence. The judgment 
was appealed; the appellant on behalf of the decisions regarding nuisance 
and the respondent on behalf of the decision regarding negligence.  
Regarding forseeability as a prerequisite for liability relating to nuisance it 
was held by Walsh J. in the S.C. of N.S.W. that:  
…I do not find in the case law on nuisance, up until the time of The 
Wagon Mound decision, any authority for the view that liability 
depends on foreseeability. It was necessary that the damages should 
not be ‘too remote’, but that requirement was not equated in these 
cases, with unforeseeable consequences.
24
  
This was the essential question that had to be determined by the Lord 
Justices in the Privy Council. In the judgment, Lord Reid held: 
                                                 
22
 Ibid, p. 667. 
23
 [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 657. 
24
 [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 402, p. 433. 
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Comparing nuisance with negligence, the main argument for the 
respondents was that in negligence foreseeability is an essential 
element in determining liability, and therefore it is logical that 
foreseeability should also be an essential element in determining the 
amount of damages; but negligence is not an essential element in 
determining liability for nuisance, and therefore it is illogical to 
bring in foreseeability when determining the amount of damages.  
It is quite true that negligence is not an essential element in 
nuisance. Nuisance is a term used to cover a wide variety of tortious 
acts or omissions and in many negligence in the narrow sense is not 
essential.
25
 
 
And although negligence may not be necessary, fault of some kind 
is almost always necessary and fault generally involves 
foreseeability.
26
 
The present case is one of creating a danger to persons or property in 
navigable waters (equivalent to a highway) and there it is admitted 
that fault is essential-in this case the negligent discharge of the oil.
27
 
 
Lord Reid then referred to a passage from a different case where Lord 
Denning had held: 
But how are we to determine whether a state of affairs in or near a 
highway is a danger? This depends I think on whether injury may 
reasonably be foreseen. If you take all the cases in the books you 
will find that if the state of affairs is such that injury may reasonably 
be anticipated to persons using the highway it is a public nuisance
28
 
 
From this, it is clear that forseeability is required to determine liability in 
cases of nuisance. What the Lord Judges then had to establish was whether 
the fire was reasonably forseeable or not.  
It was held that-  
                                                 
25
 [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 657, p. 664. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid, p. 665. 
28
 Ibid. 
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In the present case the evidence shows that the discharge of so much 
oil on to the water must have taken a considerable time, and a 
vigilant ship's engineer would have noticed the discharge at an early 
stage. The findings show that he ought to have known that it is 
possible to ignite this kind of oil on water, and that the ship's 
engineer probably ought to have known that this had, in fact, 
happened before.
29
 
If it is clear that the reasonable man would have realized or foreseen 
and prevented the risk then it must follow that the appellant is liable 
in damages.
30
 
Therefore, the judgment in favour of the respondent was upheld. 
 
While torts offer a way to claim for damages it is not very “victim friendly”.  
It is for the plaintiff/victim to show negligence on part of the polluter 
imposing on the victim the burden of proof. This can be an issue; especially, 
proving foreseeability may be difficult. However, the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur presents a better view for victims if it is applicable, and accepted by 
the Court.  
 
2.2 Legislation  
Legislators have several options to deal with liability for oil pollution 
damage. Gauci highlights two of them, namely presumption of fault and 
strict liability
31
 but there is also e.g. fault based liability based on intention 
or negligence and absolute liability in which there is no exception to 
liability (see The Empress Car
32
).  
Presumption of fault means that the burden of proof lies on the polluter to 
prove that there was no negligence on his part. Presumption of fault can be 
seen in e.g. the Hamburg Rules article 5.1.
33
 
                                                 
29
 Ibid, p. 667. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Gotthard Gauci, Oil Pollution at Sea: Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage 
(Chichester: Wiley, 1997), p. 16. 
32
 [1999] 2 A.C. 22. 
33
 “The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as 
from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place 
while the goods were in his charge as defined in article 4, unless the carrier proves that he, 
his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the 
occurrence and its consequences.” It should be noted that presumptions of fault can be 
 18 
2.2.1 Strict Liability 
The concept of strict liability has existed for some time. 
In the classic case of Rylands v. Fletcher 
34
 it was established that-  
A person who, for his own purposes, brought on his land and 
collected and kept there anything likely to do mischief if it escaped, 
had to keep it in at his peril; and if he did not do so, he was prima 
facie answerable for all the damage which was the natural 
consequence of its escape.
35
 
 
The Defendants, in order to effect an object of their own, brought on 
to their land, or on to land which for this purpose may be treated as 
being theirs, a large accumulated mass of water, and stored it up in a 
reservoir. The consequence of this was damage to the Plaintiff, and 
for that damage, however skilfully and carefully the accumulation 
was made, the Defendants, according to the principles and 
authorities to which I have adverted, were certainly responsible.
36
 
 
It could very well be imagined that this rule could be applicable for e.g. oil 
tankers carrying oil but there are several difficulties in applying this rule to 
oil pollution as Gauci points out, such as:  
Firstly, an oil spill from a tanker occurs on the sea, not on land, and 
the sea is considered to be a public highway; secondly, the use of a 
tanker to carry oil cannot be considered to be non-natural; moreover, 
very frequently, the cargo of oil and the carrying ship belong to 
different individuals or corporations.
37
 
Even though the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher cannot be directly applied in 
ship source oil pollution cases, the strict liability principle can be applied 
and is in fact applied through convention law, as carriage of oil by sea is 
considered to be a dangerous or hazardous operation, which was the 
rationale used by the House of Lords in Rylands v. Fletcher. 
 
                                                                                                                            
rebuttable or non rebuttable. Those that are rebuttable are for all practical purposes similar 
to strict liability, see Winfield and Jolowicz on tort, p.36-46. 
34
 (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid, p. 342. 
37
 Gauci, supra n. 31, p. 13. 
 19 
It is evident that strict liability has been the legislators’ preference when 
dealing with oil pollution liability. While there was some debate about the 
basis of liability at the Diplomatic Legal Conference on Marine Pollution 
Damage held in 1969, where some proposed a fault based regime, they 
eventually settled on strict liability of the shipowner subject to some 
exceptions. 
38
 
Strict liability has further been adopted in the 1971 Fund Convention; the 
1992 protocols (CLC and Fund), the 1996 HNS Convention, the 2001 
Bunkers Convention, the United States Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 1990. 
This certainly supports the idea that strict liability is the best way to go in 
order to make the polluter pay. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Colin De La Rue and Charles B. Anderson, Shipping and the Environment: Law and 
Practice (2nd edition, London: Informa, 2009), p. 14. 
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3. THE LIABILITY REGIME OF 
THE CONVENTIONS 
 
There are three conventions relating to liability and compensation for oil 
pollution damage. This chapter will explain briefly how the different 
conventions function without going into too much detail.  
 
3.1 CLC 
As explained in the introduction, the background for the CLC is based 
mainly on the Torrey Canyon disaster where it was evident that national 
legislation was not enough to deal with spills of this magnitude.  
Work began right away by both IMCO
39
 and the CMI to come up with an 
international convention covering liability and compensation for oil 
pollution damage. The result was the 1969 Civil Liability Convention for 
Oil Pollution (CLC). The CLC represents one of the major conventions of 
the IMO, having been ratified by almost all of the world’s maritime states 
(with some exceptions, the most notable one being the U.S).  
Along with the CLC, the 1971 Fund convention was adopted.
40
 The CLC 
was later amended in 1992 which is the version most states are party to. 
The basis for the convention is a strict liability regime where liability is 
“channeled” to the shipowner. There was some discussion as to who should 
be liable; the shipowner or the cargo owner but eventually, the view that the 
shipowner should be liable as the “polluter” prevailed. 
 
The 1969 CLC is applicable to any sea-going vessel and any seaborne craft 
of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo.
41
 The 1969 
CLC also applies exclusively to pollution damage caused on the territory 
including the territorial sea of a Contracting State and to preventive 
measures taken to prevent or minimise such damage.
42
 Oil means any 
persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil and 
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whale oil, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such 
a ship.
43
 Shipowners may be jointly liable as stated in article 4 
When oil has escaped or has been discharged from two or more 
ships, and pollution damage results therefrom, the owners of all the 
ships concerned, unless exonerated under Article III, shall be jointly 
and severally liable for all such damage which is not reasonably 
separable. 
This leads to an interesting possibility pointed out by Wu as follows: 
This article assumes that, in a pollution incident involving two CLC 
ships, if one of them is insolvent, the other must pay the whole 
admissible damages. It is clear that, despite the involvement of two 
tankers, it will be considered as one incident.
44
 
Article 3 provides that liability is put solely on the shipowner and paragraph 
4 of the same article states that- 
No claim for compensation for pollution damage shall be made 
against the owner otherwise than in accordance with this 
Convention. No claim for pollution damage under this Convention 
or otherwise may be made against the servants or agents of the 
owner. 
What this means is that liability is channeled to the owner with the purpose 
of giving the servants of the owner immunity from claimants.  
Article 7(8) offers the claimants the possibility to bring claims directly 
against the insurer or other person providing financial security for the 
owner’s liability for pollution damage. 
 
A key feature of the CLC is laid out in article 7(1) where it states that- 
The owner of a ship registered in a Contracting State and carrying 
more than 2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo shall be required to 
maintain insurance or other financial security, such as the guarantee 
of a bank or a certificate delivered by an international compensation 
fund in the sums fixed by applying the limits of liability prescribed 
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in Article V, paragraph 1 to cover his liability for pollution damage 
under this Convention. 
While the idea of compulsory insurance was debated in the proceedings to 
the CLC
45
 it was eventually a part of the convention. If it had not, the 
possibility for victims to get compensated would surely have looked bleaker 
as there would likely be many smaller companies perhaps only owning a 
single ship not capable of compensating victims.  
 
Limitation of liability was set at 2,000 francs for each ton of the ship’s 
tonnage with a ceiling at 210 million francs.
46
 However, the shipowner is 
not entitled to limit his liability in case the incident occurred as a result of 
the actual fault or privity of the owner.
47
 
 
While the 1969 Convention certainly solved a lot of the problems 
encountered by claimants in the case of the Torrey Canyon, there were still 
some issues surrounding oil pollution, not to mention the fact that it easily 
gets outdated with regard to currency, size of claims and therefore there was 
a need to update the convention.  
In 1978 the Amoco Cadiz carrying 220,000 tons of crude oil, suffered a 
failure of her hydraulic steering gear and consequently ran aground on 
Portsall Rocks, off the coast of Brittany, with the consequence that her 
entire cargo escaped. Approximately 200 miles of coastline was polluted, 
this in a very important fishing and tourist region of France.  
The CLC was applicable, however the Fund Convention was not.
48
 As such, 
the shipowner was able to limit his liability to an amount which was about 
15 per cent of the sums claimed.
49
  
The claimants then filed actions against Amoco Transport Co.  and others in 
the Amoco Group (including Amoco International Oil Co. subsidiaries to 
Standard Oil Co. Of Indiana, responsible for operation of Amoco’s tanker 
fleet) in which they claimed that the Amoco Cadiz casualty was caused by 
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the negligence of the Amoco parties in the course of constructing, 
maintaining and operating the tanker in a federal district court in the United 
States. The Court applied the law of the forum (US law).  
Eventually, after a long process it was held that- 
AIOC negligently performed its duty to ensure that Amoco Cadiz in 
general and its steering gear in particular were seaworthy, 
adequately maintained and in proper repair.
50
 
 
Standard therefore is liable for its own negligence and the 
negligence of AIOC and Transport with respect to the design, 
operation, maintenance, repair and crew training of Amoco Cadiz. 
Standard therefore is liable to the French claimants for damages 
resulting from the grounding of Amoco Cadiz.
51
 
The right to limit liability was denied to Standard Oil Co. of Indiana and 
Amoco International Oil Co. since they were not shipowners.
52
 
Additionally AIOC failed to make Amoco Cadiz seaworthy prior to the last 
voyage and, for that reason among other things, it could not limit its 
liability.
53
 
 
  
Two years after the Amoco Cadiz, the Malagasy tanker Tanio broke 
amidships and as a result about 13500 tons of cargo oil was spilled, causing 
pollution damage to the coast of Brittany. However, at this time the Fund 
Convention was in force. The total amount claimed was about FFr 527 
million (US$ 56 million) while the final amount of claims agreed by the 
IOPC Fund was approximately FFr 350 million (US$ 37.3 million). The 
total amount payable under the Fund Convention was about FFr 245 million 
(US$ 26.1).
54
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At this point it was clear that the limit in the CLC was set too low. In the 
1984 Protocols the limit was therefore increased from 133 to 420 SDRs per 
ton. The Protocols however failed to enter into force. 
In 1990 the OPA 1990 came into force, this meant that the US were not 
likely to ratify the CLC and in 1991 another major disaster struck when the 
Cypriot tanker Haven caught fire while anchored outside of Genoa. 
The tanker broke which led to oil escaping, polluting the coastline of both 
Italy and France.  
The compensation claimed was well over the limit of the CLC and the Fund 
Convention. 
 
To deal with the “flaws” of the 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund Convention, an 
IMO Diplomatic Conference was convened in London in 1992 leading to 
the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund Convention. 
The limits set out in the 1969 Convention were changed to as follows: 
The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this 
Convention in respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount 
calculated as follows: a) 3 million units of account for a ship not 
exceeding 5,000 units of tonnage; b) for a ship with a tonnage in 
excess thereof, for each additional unit of tonnage, 420 units of 
account in addition to the amount mentioned in subparagraph (a); 
provided, however, that this aggregate amount shall not in any event 
exceed 59.7 million units of account.
55
 
In 2003 the limits were further raised to the following amounts: 
 
(a) for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of tonnage, 4,510,000 SDR; 
(b) for a ship between 5000 and 140,000 units of tonnage 4,510,000 
SDR plus 631 SDR for each additional unit of tonnage; and (c) for a 
ship of 140,000 units of tonnage and above, 89,770,000 SDR.
56
 
With the conclusion of UNCLOS in 1982, every state had the right to 
establish an exclusive economic zone of not more than 200 nautical miles 
from the baseline.
57
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The geographical scope was changed and the 1992 Convention applies- 
a) to pollution damage caused: i) in the territory, including the 
territorial sea, of a Contracting State, and ii) in the exclusive 
economic zone of a Contracting State, established in accordance 
with international law, or, if a Contracting State has not established 
such a zone, in an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of 
that State determined by that State in accordance with international 
law and extending not more than 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured;b) 
to preventive measures, wherever taken, to prevent or minimise such 
damage.
58
 
The definition of “ship” in the 1969 Convention was a cause for concern as 
it only covered “laden” tankers, meaning tankers on ballast voyage were not 
covered. Consequently the definition was changed to cover- 
any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever  
constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, 
provided that a ship capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall 
be regarded as a ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as 
cargo and during any voyage following such carriage unless it is 
proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk 
aboard.
59
 
The definition in the 1992 Convention covers pollution caused by “unladen” 
tankers on ballast voyages. 
  
The “channeling” provision in the 1969 Convention as seen in the case of 
the Amoco Cadiz proved to be ineffective and changes were made in the 
1992 Convention. In the 1992 Protocols all claims must be channeled 
against the owner.
60
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Under the old regime the limits of liability could be broken if the incident 
occurred was the shipowner’s actual fault or privity.61 This proved to be 
relatively easy to break as seen by a number of English cases such as The 
Lady Gwendolen
62
. In determining the presence or absence of actual fault or 
privity it was held by Winn L.J. that- 
First: an owner who seeks to limit his liability must establish that, 
although for the immediate cause of the occurrence he is responsible 
on the basis of respondeat superior, in no respect which might 
possibly have causatively contributed was he himself at fault. An 
established causative link is an essential element of any actionable 
breach of duty: therefore, "actual fault" in this context does not 
invariably connote actionable breach of duty. 
Second: an owner is not himself without actual fault if he owed any 
duty to the party damaged or injured which (a) was not discharged; 
(b) to secure the proper discharge of which he should himself have 
done but failed to do something which in the given circumstances 
lay within his personal sphere of performance.
63
 
 
The rule of “actual fault or privity” was at this point the norm in convention 
law as exemplified by the 1957 Limitation Convention.
64
 However, in the 
1976 LLMC “conduct barring limitation” was worded as follows: 
A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is 
proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, 
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committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such loss would probably result.
65
 
The test was the same in the 1984 Protocols and later in the 1992 CLC 
where it reads: 
The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this 
Convention if it is proved that the pollution damage resulted from 
his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such 
damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result.
66
 
As mentioned above, limitation prior to the 1992 CLC was relatively easy to 
break. This did not sit well with the insurance industry, because if liability 
was unlimited, premiums would have to be sky-high and that the “quid pro 
quo for raised limits was a watertight provision making limits virtually 
unbreakable.”67 
Under the new test, the claimant does not only have to carry the burden of 
proof for the merits of the case, but also have to prove that the shipowner is 
not entitled to limit his liability. This gives the shipowner a much stronger 
case as the threshold for actual fault under the old regime is without intent. 
 
3.2 The Fund Convention 
While the CLC provides the first tier of compensation, the second tier of 
compensation is provided by the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage (The Fund Convention).There is also a third tier available 
in the Supplementary Fund Protocol of 2003. The Fund Convention was 
adopted in 1971 and came into force in 1978. 
 
The discussion surrounding the Convention was that it would be unfair for 
the shipowner to be exclusively responsible for the economic consequences 
of pollution damage considering the nature of the goods. The pollution 
damage would not have taken place if the ship was carrying e.g. rice and 
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therefore, putting the entire blame on the shipowner would not be just. 
Although there was no precedent on assigning liability on a “non-
performing” party, it was felt that there was nothing stopping the legislators 
from assigning the cargo owners some responsibility for providing 
supplementary compensation through a suitable mechanism.
68
 
 
The purpose of the Fund is to pay for compensation to any person suffering 
pollution damage if such person has been unable to obtain full and adequate 
compensation for the damage under the terms of the Liability Convention.
69
 
There are three different scenarios in which this can occur. 
The first scenario is if there is no liability incurred under the CLC, e.g. if the 
shipowner managed to successfully plead any of the defenses set out in the 
CLC. The second circumstance in which the Fund pays is if the liable owner 
is unable to meet the obligations incurred in the CLC and any financial 
security that may be provided under that Convention does not cover or is 
insufficient to satisfy the claims for compensation for the damage, e.g. if the 
owner is insolvent. 
The last and most common scenario is when the damage exceeds the 
owner’s liability limit under the CLC.70 
 
The Fund does not incur liability in much the same way that owners are 
exonerated from liability in the CLC
71
 and further-  
If the Fund proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or 
partially either from an act or omission done with intent to cause 
damage by the person who suffered the damage or from the 
negligence of that person, the Fund may be exonerated wholly or 
partially from its obligation to pay compensation to such person 
provided, however, that there shall be no such exoneration with 
regard to such preventive measures which are compensated under 
paragraph 1. The Fund shall in any event be exonerated to the extent 
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that the shipowner may have been exonerated under Article III, 
paragraph 3, of the Liability Convention.
72
  
 
The Fund acquires by subrogation, the rights the person so compensated 
may enjoy under the Liability Convention against the owner or his 
guarantor.
73
  
 
Contributions to the Fund shall be made in respect of each Contracting State 
by any person has received in one calendar year more than 150,000 tons of 
crude oil and fuel oil after sea transport in ports or terminal installations of a 
state party immediately after carriage by sea.
74
 The Fund shall in each 
Contracting State be recognized as a legal person capable under the laws of 
that State of assuming rights and obligations and of being a party in legal 
proceedings before the courts of that State.
75
 This means that the Fund can 
be sued and therefore be liable for compensation in the same way as any 
other entity is liable under CLC.  
 
The changes in the 1992 Fund Convention reflect the changes made in the 
1992 CLC and the Fund functions mainly in the same way as the 1971 
Convention.  The compensation were raised and the aggregate amount of 
compensation payable by the Fund shall in respect of any one incident be 
limited, so that the total sum of that amount and the amount of 
compensation actually paid under the 1992 CLC shall not exceed 135 
million SDR. The Fund is liable for the excess of the aggregated 
compensation after the shipowner has paid up to his limit according to the 
CLC. However, the maximum amount can be increased to 200 million SDR 
with respect to any incident occurring during any period when there are 
three Parties to this Convention in respect of which the combined relevant 
quantity of contributing oil received by persons in the territories of such 
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Parties, during the preceding calendar year, equalled or exceeded 600 
million tons.
76
 
 
In 2000, the limits were further raised to 203 million SDR and in the special 
case of article 6.3(c) the limit is 300,740,000 SDR.
77
 
As mentioned before, a third tier of compensation was added in 2003 with 
the Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of  
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992. 
Like the Fund, the Supplementary Fund shall in each Contracting State be 
recognized as a legal person capable under the laws of that State of 
assuming rights and obligations and of being a party in legal proceedings 
before the courts of that State.
78
 The Protocol functions in the same way as 
the Fund but the limit to compensation is set at 750 million SDR.
79
  
 
3.3 Bunkers 
While the CLC and the Fund offer victims of oil pollution damage ways to 
get compensation, they only cover damage caused by ships carrying oil as 
cargo. There is no mention of pollution damage caused by ships other than 
tankers. With the size of dry bulk carriers and container ships nowadays, 
they can carry a very large amount of oil in their bunkers (even more than 
some tankers carry as cargo). Not only can ships carry large amounts of 
bunker oil but as these oils are in general highly viscous and persistent, 
hence even small amounts can cause a lot of damage to the environment.
80
  
As such, there was a “gap” in the international regimes regarding oil 
pollution and claimants had to seek compensation through national law.  
This gap was filled by the 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (hereafter referred to as “Bunkers”) which 
entered into force in 2008. 
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Bunkers is largely based on the CLC and consequently shares many of the 
features of the CLC. However, there are some significant differences. A ship 
is defined as “any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft, of any type 
whatsoever”81 while bunker oil means “any hydrocarbon mineral oil, 
including lubricating oil, used or intended to be used for the operation or 
propulsion of the ship, and any residues of such oil.”82 While the CLC 
covers oil pollution damage caused by tankers, whether it is carried as cargo 
or bunker oil, Bunkers covers oil pollution damage caused by all other ships 
carrying oil in their bunkers. 
 
For pollution damage as defined in the CLC, Bunkers is not applicable, even 
if compensation is not payable under that regime.   
This can lead to interesting and problematic scenarios as pointed out by Wu 
in that:  
If a laden tanker spills oil (bunker or cargo) in a country that is not 
party to any of the CLCs, but is party to the Bunkers Convention, 
neither the CLC nor the Bunkers Convention shall apply.
83
 
 
If an unladen tanker spills bunker oil in a country that is a party to 
both CLC 69 and Bunkers Convention, neither CLC69 nor the 
Bunkers Convention shall apply.
84
 
In the 1992 CLC, unladen tankers are also covered and therefore the second 
situation would not occur if a state is party to both the 1992 CLC and 
Bunkers.  
 
A major difference between Bunkers and the CLC is the definition of 
“shipowner”. While all liability is channeled to the registered owner in the 
CLC, Bunkers offer a much wider definition of shipowner: 
“Shipowner” means the owner, including the registered owner, bareboat 
charterer, manager and operator of the ship.
85
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There is no channeling provision in Bunkers; consequently it is possible for 
claimants to pursue persons other than shipowners independently of the 
Convention. If more than one person is liable, their liability shall be joint 
and several.
86
 
 
The CLC/Fund is a two-tier regime and for some states three-tiered, 
Bunkers however is single-tiered and there is no fund bearing part of the 
compensation. Whilst this could make adequate compensation an issue, the 
fact that claimants have a wider array of “shipowners” should be enough for 
compensation to suffice without a fund. Another issue with the lack of a 
fund dedicated to bunker pollution is that bunker spill claims must compete 
with other claims subject to limitation under the relevant global limitation.
87
 
 
Another major difference between CLC and Bunkers is that shipowners 
have the right to limit their liability under the liability scheme of CLC. 
 
Bunkers offer no right to limit liability based on a provision in the 
Convention, instead it is stated that: 
Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of the 
shipowner and the person or persons providing insurance or 
other financial security to limit liability under any applicable 
national or international regime, such as the Convention on 
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, as 
amended.
88
 
As there is no unified limit of liability, some issues might arise.  
There is a possibility that a state with no limitation in the national law joins 
the Bunkers Convention meaning that liability will be unlimited
89
, as put by 
former Director of the IOPC Funds Måns Jacobsson “the limitation amount 
will differ, dependent on the State in which the pollution occurs; if that State 
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does not provide in its national law for limitation of liability for maritime 
claims, the liability under the Bunker Convention will be unlimited.”90 
 
It is not entirely clear whether pollution from bunker oil is covered in the 
LLMC as it is not mentioned in either article 2 which sets out when there is 
a right to limit liability or article 3 which lists claims where the right to 
limitation does not apply. An option for solving this problem is the approach 
taken by the UK set out in the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 where liability 
for ships other than tankers is set out in section 154.
91
 The applicable 
provision for limitation of liability for bunker oil spills is section 168 where 
it is stated that- 
For the purposes of section 185 any liability incurred under section 
154 shall be deemed to be a liability to damages in respect of such 
damage to property as is mentioned in paragraph 1(a) of Article 2 of 
the Convention in Part I of Schedule 7.
92
  
As pollution from bunker oil is considered to be damage to property, it is a 
claim for which limitation is available in the LLMC thus solving the 
problem. 
In the 1976 LLMC the limits are: 
b) in respect of any other claims, (i) 167,000 Units of Account for a 
ship with a tonnage not exceeding 500 tons, (ii) for a ship with a 
tonnage in excess thereof the following amount in addition to that 
mentioned in (i): - for each ton from 501 to 30,000 tons, 167 Units 
of Account: - for each ton from 30,001 to 70,000 tons, 125 Units of 
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Account; and - for each ton in excess of 70,000 tons, 83 Units of 
Account.
93
  
In the Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation  
of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 the limits are raised to: 
(i) 1 million Units of Account for at ship with a tonnage not 
exceeding 2,000 tons, (ii) for at ship with a tonnage in excess 
thereof, the following amount in addition to that  
mentioned in (i): - for each ton from 2,001 to 30,000 tons, 400 Units 
of Account; - for each ton from 30,001 to 70,000 tons, 300 Units of 
Account; and - for each ton in excess of 70,000 tons, 200 Units of 
Account. 
94
 
As with the CLC, insurance is compulsory. 
The registered owner of a ship having a gross tonnage greater than 
1000 registered in a State Party shall be required to maintain 
insurance or other financial security, such as the guarantee of a bank 
or similar financial institution, to cover the liability of the registered 
owner for pollution damage in an amount equal to the limits of 
liability under the applicable national or international limitation 
regime, but in all cases, not exceeding an amount calculated  
in accordance with the Convention on Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims, 1976, as amended.
95
 
What is noteworthy in this provision is that insurance is only compulsory 
for the registered owner but not for any other person that is defined as 
shipowner in article 3(1). Whilst Bunkers helps fill a gap in the international 
regime of oil pollution, there are some issues, such as the lack of uniformity. 
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3.4 Pollution damage and preventive measures 
In order to make a successful claim for oil pollution damage, obviously the 
damage suffered must be within the convention’s definition of pollution 
damage. 
In the 1969 CLC, pollution damage is defined as a 
 loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by  
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the 
ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, and includes the 
costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures.
96
 
Preventive measures are defined as “any reasonable measures taken by any 
person after an incident has occurred to prevent or minimize pollution 
damage.”97 
An incident is defined as “any occurrence, or series of occurrences having 
the same origin, which causes pollution damage.”98 
 
In the 1992 Convention the definition of “pollution damage” was slightly 
changed read as follows: 
a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting 
from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such 
escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation for 
impairment of the environment other than loss of profit  
from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable 
measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken; 
b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage 
caused by preventive measures.
99
 
The definition of “incident” read as follows: 
any occurrence, or series of occurrences having the same origin, 
which causes pollution damage or creates a grave and imminent 
threat of causing such damage.
100
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Bunkers has got a similar definition although it, of course, relates to damage 
from bunker oil pollution.
101
 
 
The new definition of incident means that in the “current regime” the right 
of recovery is extended to include so-called threat removal measures, while 
the “old regime” is generally regarded to exclude pre-spill costs incurred in 
“pure threat” situations. 102 Former Director of the IOPC Fund, Måns 
Jacobsson stated in regards to the old regime that- 
The IOPC Fund has taken the position that the Civil Liability 
Convention and the Fund Convention apply only to damage caused 
and measures taken after an incident has occurred  in which oil has 
escaped or been discharged. The Conventions do not apply to what 
have been called ‘pure threat-removal measures’, i.e., measures 
which are so successful that there is no actual spill of oil from the 
tanker concerned. In addition, the position of the IOPC Fund has 
been that if a spill occurs, only damage caused or costs of measures 
taken after the spill are compensable; costs of so-called pre-spill 
measures are thus not compensated.
103
 
The changes made to the definition of “incident” were therefore much 
needed to ensure that all types of preventive measures are covered.  
 
Under the old regime, the definition of “pollution damage” has a very 
general meaning, giving national courts a high amount of freedom to 
interpret pollution damage as they see fit, which is normal and acceptable 
for international conventions on civil liability, according to Jacobsson and 
Trotz.
104
 This may lead to “considerable divergences of interpretation of this 
definition.”105  
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However, since in respect of the Fund Convention, states share the costs of 
compensation, a uniform interpretation of the definition of pollution damage 
was essential as this could otherwise lead to unfairness
106
 and some 
legitimate types of claims would rejected by courts with no case-law 
allowing for compensation in this specific case.
107
 
 
The addition of “provided that compensation for impairment of the 
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited 
to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to 
be undertaken”108 specifies what is covered by the conventions. 
… claims for damage to the marine environment as such are not 
admissible, and on the other hand, that the costs incurred in restoring 
the marine environment after a pollution incident are recoverable 
under the Conventions.
109
 
In order to avoid speculative claims, compensation for reinstatement of the 
environment must have been actually undertaken or to be undertaken.    
This is to prevent claims which are based on theoretical quantification of 
environmental damage and do not relate to actual reinstatement of the 
environment.
110
 
 
It should also be noted that measures to reinstate the environment must be 
reasonable. There have been several incidents where this rule has been set to 
the test, especially in cases concerning subsea pumping operations. 
In essence this type of claim is reasonable depending on certain factors such 
as: risk of oil being released from the wreck in the foreseeable future; the 
wreck has been situated in a location where an escape of oil would likely 
cause significant damage to the marine environment.
111
  
One such claim was made after the Dolly, carrying about 200 tonnes of 
bitumen sank on 5 November 1999 in 20 metres depth in Robert Bay, 
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Martinique. The ship sank very close to a national park, a coral reef and 
mariculture and artisanal fishing is carried out in the area. There were fears 
that fishing and mariculture would be affected if bitumen were to escape. 
As the ship was not originally a tanker, but a general cargo vessel, there was 
an issue whether the Dolly was a “ship” as defined by the conventions but it 
was found that- 
…although the Dolly had been originally designed as a general 
cargo vessel, it had subsequently been adapted for the carriage of oil 
in bulk as cargo, and that it therefore fell within the definition of 
'ship' laid down in the 1992 Civil Liability Convention.
112
 
The shipowner was ordered by the authorities to remove the wreck but 
failed to do so, therefore the French authorities arranged for the removal of 
3.5 tonnes of bunker oil and requested three international salvage companies 
to investigate what measures could be taken to eliminate the threat of 
pollution by bitumen.
113
 
In July 2001 the Committee concurred with the Director's opinion 
that, in view of the location of the wreck in an environmentally 
sensitive area, an operation to remove the threat of pollution by the 
bitumen would in principle constitute 'preventive measures' as 
defined in the 1992 Conventions. 
 
In March 2006 the French Government submitted a claim for €1 388 
361 (£980 000) for the costs of removing the bunker fuel and the 
bitumen cargo from the wreck. In June 2006 the claim was increased 
to €1 457 753 (£1 030 000) to take into account additional costs 
arising from the technical and meteorological problems. 
The shipowner does not have financial resources to pay any 
compensation. As mentioned in paragraph 1.3, the ship did not have 
any liability insurance. For these reasons the Director decided that 
the 1992 Fund should compensate the French Government under 
Article 4.1(b) of the 1992 Fund Convention.
114
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Even though it was unlikely in this case that the oil would surface, the ship 
was in such a sensitive area it was enough for the preventive measures to be 
deemed as reasonable.  
 
In another recent case the outcome was different.  
On 13 November 2002, the Bahamas-registered tanker Prestige carrying 76 
972 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, began listing and leaking oil some 30 
kilometres off Cabo Finisterre (Galicia, Spain). On 19 November, whilst 
under tow away from the coast, the vessel broke in two and sank some 260 
kilometres west of Vigo (Spain), the bow section to a depth of 3 500 metres 
and the stern section to a depth of 3 830 metres. The break-up and sinking 
released an estimated 63 272 tonnes of cargo. Over the following weeks oil 
continued to leak from the wreck at a declining rate. It was subsequently 
estimated by the Spanish Government that approximately 13 700 tonnes of 
cargo remained in the wreck.
115
 The Spanish Government concluded that the 
oil left in the wreck needed to be dealt with and consequently hired a 
company to remove the oil. This was concluded in 2004. The Spanish 
Government submitted a claim for €109.2 million (£75 million) for the cost 
of the operation to remove the oil from the wreck of the Prestige, including 
the costs of preparatory work and the feasibility trials conducted in the 
Mediterranean and at the wreck site. In February 2006 this claim was 
reduced to €24.2 million (£16.5 million).116 
 
The issue is whether the operation to remove oil was reasonable or not 
according to the 1992 Fund's admissibility criteria. This criteria can be 
found in the IOPC Fund Claims Manual. 
Claims for the costs of measures to prevent or minimise pollution 
damage are assessed on the basis of objective criteria. The fact that a 
government or other public body decides to take certain measures 
does not in itself mean that the measures are reasonable for the 
purpose of compensation under the Conventions. The technical 
reasonableness is assessed on the basis of the facts available at the 
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time of the decision to take the measures. However, those in charge 
of the operations should continually reappraise their decisions in the 
light of developments and technical advice.
117
 
Technical experts stated that the most likely outcome if the oil was left 
alone would- 
…have been a slow escape of oil from the wreck over many years 
resulting in the widespread scattering of tar balls over a vast area of 
the Atlantic Ocean which, depending on winds and currents could 
have impacted coastlines…118 
The experts further stated that- 
…it was impossible to quantify the scale of likely pollution damage 
in monetary terms had the oil not been removed from the wreck, but 
that the most likely oil release scenario would not have constituted a 
serious threat to marine resources.
119
 
In the opinion of the Director the claim is inadmissible. 
The Director remains of the view that the costs of the actual 
operation to remove the oil from the wreck of the Prestige were 
disproportionate to any potential economic and environmental 
consequences of leaving the oil in the wreck and that for this reason 
the claim by the Spanish Government does not fulfil the 1992 Fund's 
admissibility criteria, namely that the operation should be reasonable 
from an objective, technical point of view.
120
 
As such, the Spanish Government did not receive compensation for the 
measures taken in removing the oil from the wreck. 
While the Conventions do give some meaning to the definition of “pollution 
damage” and when it is compensable there are still many uncertainties such 
as defining “environmental damage”, who has standing (locus standi) in 
court and compensation for pure economic loss.  
These issues will be discussed in the following chapters 
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4. ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
The definition of “pollution damage” in the CLC/Fund reads as previously 
seen:  
loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting 
from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such 
escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation for 
impairment of the environment other than loss of profit  from such 
impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of 
reinstatement  actually undertaken or to be undertaken.
121
 
While this definition is perchance not as unclear and general as it was in the 
69 CLC
122
 it still does not give a definition that makes for a uniform 
application of the Conventions, leaving the outcome for oil pollution claims 
uncertain depending on where the incident take place.  
 
4.1 Definition 
“Environment” is often used in international conventions without being 
defined.
123
  
This is largely because defining “environment” is very difficult as it is such 
a broad term. For the purpose of preserving and preventing marine 
pollution, UNCLOS refers to the “environment” as “rare or fragile 
ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered 
species and other forms of marine life”124; and marine pollution as:  
“pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by 
man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result 
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine 
life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, 
including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of 
quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.
125
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Natural resources can be defined as “including living and non-living natural 
resources such as land, habitats, fish, wildlife, air, water, ground water and 
ecosystems.”126 
There are two dimensions to the environment; the tangible and the 
intangible.
127
 
The tangible aspect is characterized by things readily perceptible 
even if invisible and can be conveniently captioned as natural 
resources, living or non-living. The intangible aspect is 
circumscribed by the aesthetic attribute of the environment, which 
translates into the human enjoyment factor, or where damage is 
alleged, deprivation of it.
128
 
 
There might be merit to leaving the definition of “environment” vague as 
done in the CLC as it is such a difficult to define and in any case “any 
definition of ‘the environment’ will simply have the Alice-in-Wonderland 
quality of meaning what we want it to mean.”129 On the other hand, a clear 
definition would give a more uniform treatment and certainty when dealing 
with environmental damage in conventions. 
 
First, a distinction has to be made in that “environmental damage” can be 
damage to the environment per se; or damage to property, personal injury or 
pure economic losses occurring as a consequence of damage to the 
environment.
130
 The general definition in the old regime (1969 CLC/71 
Fund) led to uncertainty, leaving interpretation to the national courts. The 
consequence of this being several cases where national courts have allowed 
claims for compensation, later rejected by the IOPC Fund, e.g. in the 
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Antonio Gramsci case
131
 The definition led to criticism and as put by 
Abecassis “The 1969 Convention’s definition is so vague that it is not really 
a definition.”132 
 
The definition in the “current” regime133 relates to reinstatement, or 
reimbursement of the costs for restoration.  However, there are still issues 
surrounding pollution damage, and as stated by Gautier: “…in particular as 
regards damage that cannot be repaired and temporary loss of ecological 
services pending the restoration of the environment.”134 
On the topic of environmental damage, it is stated in the IOPC Fund claims 
manual that- 
Compensation is payable for the costs of reasonable reinstatement 
measures aimed at accelerating natural recovery of environmental 
damage. Contributions may be made to the costs of post-spill studies 
provided that they relate to damage which falls within the definition 
of pollution damage under the Conventions, including studies to 
establish the nature and extent of environmental damage caused by 
an oil spill and to determine whether or not reinstatement measures 
are necessary and feasible.
135
 
Claims for the costs of measures of reinstatement of the environment will 
qualify for compensation only if the following criteria are fulfilled: 
• The measures should be likely to accelerate significantly the 
natural process of recovery. 
• The measures should seek to prevent further damage as a result of 
the incident. 
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• The measures should, as far as possible, not result in the 
degradation of other habitats or in adverse consequences for other 
natural or economic resources. 
• The measures should be technically feasible. 
• The costs of the measures should not be out of proportion to the 
extent and duration of the damage and the benefits likely to be 
achieved.
136
 
 
However, this does not do much to give any clarity as to what is 
environmental damage. 
 
By comparison, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) takes a more 
detailed approach in defining “environmental damage”.137 OPA 90 also 
defines the meaning of natural resources and removal of oil: 
"natural resources" includes land, fish, wildlife, biota,  air, water, 
ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources 
belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or 
otherwise controlled by the United States (including the resources of 
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the exclusive economic zone), any State or local government or 
Indian tribe, or any foreign government.
138
 
 
"remove" or "removal" means containment and removal of oil or a 
hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the taking of other 
actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the 
public health or welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, 
wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines, and beaches.
139
 
 
The CLC/Fund definitely leaves some uncertainties. In the CLC, 
compensation is only available for impairment of the environment, limited 
to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement; however there is no 
criterion for determining whether the impairment is such that restoration is 
necessary.
140
 Measures need to be reasonable but there is no test of 
reasonableness mentioned in the CLC/Fund. The 1993 Working Group 
establishes that measures for reinstatement of the environment would have 
to fulfill the following criteria in order to be admissible for compensation: 
 (a) the costs are reasonable;  
(b) the cost of the measures should not be disproportionate to 
the results achieved or the results which could reasonably be 
expected; and 
(c) the measures should be appropriate and offer a reasonable 
prospect of success.
141
 
However, these are just guidelines and not actually a part of the Fund or the 
CLC. As such, there are definitely flaws with the definition in the “current 
regime”. 
 
Professor Mukherjee proposed the following changes to the CLC: 
First, the definition of pollution damage may be re-crafted as 
follows: ‘Pollution damage’ means Loss or damage caused outside 
the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of 
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oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur 
including environmental damage; The costs of preventive measures 
and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures. 
Second, flowing from the above and for the sake of completeness, a 
new definition should be included as follows: ‘Environmental 
damage’ includes damage to natural resources, loss of amenities and 
deprivation of quiet enjoyment in relation to the environment.
142
 
 
He further stated that at an appropriate place the following should be 
inserted: 
(1) The locus standi of a claimant in respect of a claim for 
environmental damage may be based on a proprietary interest vested 
in the claimant, or the doctrine of public trust or parens patriae as 
may be appropriate. 
(2) Compensation for environmental damage shall be limited to 
costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or 
to be undertaken, and may include loss of profit suffered by the 
claimant as a consequence of the environmental damage.
143
 
 
4.2 Locus Standi 
One of the issues with the CLC is that it is not concerned with who is 
entitled to claim compensation for costs incurred in restoring the 
environment. As stated by Professor Mukherjee- 
The tribunal must have jurisdiction over the subject matter under 
dispute and the parties appearing before it and the litigants must 
have locus standi or standing to appear in that tribunal to plead their 
respective cases.
144
 
However, the CLC/Fund does not specify who has standing. This is 
particularly troublesome when damage is done to property where it is 
difficult to say who the owner is, or if the property has the status of res 
nullius i.e belonging to no one.  
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If there is no proprietary interest vested in the subject-matter damaged, the 
plaintiff’s claim may well be denied.145  
 
It is evident that locus standi is dependent on a proprietary interest vested in 
the environment, this in most cases meaning ownership of the property. As 
mentioned above the environment is either tangible or intangible. Natural 
resources e.g. the seabed, flora and fauna, fish are all tangible and can 
therefore be subject to ownership. In the event that ownership is 
successfully established, a claimant should be able to plead locus standi.
146
 
For damage done to the intangible dimension of the environment it is stated 
by Professor Mukherjee that- 
It is arguable that by virtue of ownership, a person can claim 
compensation for deprivation of enjoyment derived from the 
aesthetic attributes of the environment caused by environmental 
damage.
147
 
 
As seen, if ownership of the damaged property can be proven, the claimant 
should be able to plead locus standi, however this may differ depending on 
the jurisdiction. For example, in some jurisdictions ownership of the 
property does not necessarily include a proprietary interest. In common law 
jurisdictions, private parties can only on occasion claim an ownership 
interest in natural resources such as air, water, fish and wildlife sufficient to 
support a claim for damages to the resource itself.
148
  
This reflects the common law rule of ferae naturae, meaning that private 
ownership of animals and other living resources is prohibited before they 
are captured or otherwise reduced to possession.
149
  
 
Public entities are able to plead locus standi if they manage to prove a 
proprietary interest in the subject-matter damaged. However, ownership of 
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land and water is rarely vested in the state with some exceptions, most 
notably in certain communist legal regimes.  
As mentioned by De la Rue and Anderson in reference of the 1969 
CLC/1971 Fund in respect of claims for environmental damage: 
In most contracting States it is likely that the absence of any 
proprietary interest in the marine environment, coupled with 
difficulties in valuing the environment (or damage to it) by methods 
which are not unduly or arbitrary, would constitute insuperable 
obstacles to such a claim.
150
  
 
In reference to the Amoco Cadiz it has been said that- 
As far as ecological damage is concerned, the claim, which was 
based on the value determination of species killed in the intertidal 
zone by the oil spill, was rejected by the District Court on the 
ground that the damage was “subject to the principle of res nullius” 
and that under French law “neither the state not the communes has 
standing to assert claims for damage to the ecosystem in the 
maritime public domain”.151 
 
In order to establish locus standi for public entities, there are, 
notwithstanding ownership, two different principles applicable; the public 
trust doctrine and the principle of parens patriae. 
 
4.2.1 Public trust doctrine and parens patriae 
 “Some types of natural resources are held in trust by government for the 
benefit of the public” and “these resources are protected by the trust against 
unfair dealing and dissipation, which is classical trust language suggesting 
the necessity for procedural correctness and substantive care”.152  
The trustee has a “duty” to protect the property and deal with it accordingly. 
Because of the trust, locus standi is conferred on the public authority as a  
“trustee in the event of damage inflicted on the protected resources.”153  
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In reference to the United States (where the public trust doctrine is perhaps 
most advanced) it has been said that through the public trust doctrine 
common law standards are established for judicial protection of the public’s 
interest in navigation, fisheries, the environment, and in clean water, 
especially in the absence of statute law.
154
 
However, in the United States most states have primary control over most 
living resources within their borders as was established in McCready v. 
Virginia where it was held: 
The State owns the tide-waters themselves, and the fish in them so 
far as they are capable of ownership while running. For this purpose 
the State represents its people and the ownership is that of the 
people in their united sovereignty.
155
  
In many states there are specific statutes authorizing the recovery of natural 
resource damage.
156
 In OPA 90 it says: 
"natural resources" includes land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, 
water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such 
resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, 
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States 
(including the resources of the exclusive economic zone), any  
State or local government or Indian tribe, or any foreign 
government.
157
 
The polluter is liable through section 2702 of OPA 90; when damage is 
done to the environment, the entities named in said section
158
 will enjoy 
locus standi. 
Parens patriae is a version of the public trust doctrine. Through parens 
patriae a state may claim a right of action for a common injury to a number 
of its citizens.
159
 As pointed out by de la Rue and Anderson, parens patriae 
may be invoked even if no state proprietary interest has been injured if two 
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conditions are met. First, the action must be based on a state interest which 
is separate from damage suffered by individual citizens. Secondly, a 
substantial part of the citizens of the state must have suffered from the 
incident.
160
 
 
There are several cases supporting the doctrines of public trust and parens 
patriae. In the case of Patmos, a Greek tanker (Patmos) collided with a 
Spanish vessel in the straits of Messina and approximately 700 tonnes of oil 
escaped. The Italian Ministry of Shipping claimed for ecological damage, it 
was held by the Court that- 
The right to pursue a case for the damage in question cannot but 
appertain to the State, as the representative body of the national 
collectivity (the same State safeguards the interests of the said 
collectivity in relation to the ecological, biological and sociological 
equilibrium of the territory including the territorial sea); this right of 
action has its basis not so much in the fact that the State pays for the 
repair of pollution damage or in the fact of having suffered an 
economic loss, but in its function in safeguarding the collectivity 
and interests referred to above.
161
 
The Court defined “damage to the environment” as “anything that impairs, 
deteriorates or destroys the environment”162; this also includes damage 
suffered by the community which benefits from natural resources present in 
the area. 
163
 This was referred to as the “Public’s loss of use and enjoyment 
of natural resources, and of other values that these resources have for the 
community (health, food, tourism, research, biological studies).
164
  
Because of these losses, the state had locus standi. 
In another Italian case, that of the Haven, the judge held that- 
[T]he 1969 Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention did 
not exclude environmental damage; that the State of Italy was 
entitled to compensation for such damage, but not other parties such 
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as local authorities; and that the damage could not be quantified 
according to a commercial or economic evaluation.
165
   
In the American case of the Zoe Colocotroni it was held- 
As a sovereign it [Puerto Rico] represents the collective interests of 
the People of this jurisdiction. The Commonwealth holds title in 
trust to the public property and domain, and it is charged with the 
protection of the People’s interest in the same. . . . In the execution 
of these endeavours the Commonwealth may bring legal actions in 
court to protect its property and recover damages to the same. . . . 
The Commonwealth has title to all beaches and to the maritime 
terrestrial zone abutting the navigable waters. . . . The 
Commonwealth is thus the owner of both the living and nonliving 
resources located in the navigable waters of the Commonwealth and 
those on the bottom and its subsoil, as well as those located within 
the referred to maritime-terrestrial zone. . . . The Commonwealth 
therefore has standing to sue to recover for oil pollution to Bahia 
Sucia and related resources because it has proprietary interest in the 
same . . . and because it is the trustee of the public trust in these 
resources. . . . Additionally, in its capacity as parens patriae, the 
Commonwealth has a sovereign interest in the general welfare of its 
citizens which transcends any injury which may be caused to its 
proprietary interests or to the property of its individual citizens. 
Particularly when a nuisance of disastrous proportions occurs such 
as in the case of a maritime oil spill, the special status of the body 
politic vis-a`-vis its citizens gives rise to a right to seek redress on 
behalf of the collective community which is not limited to the 
abatement of the nuisance, but which can allow for recovery of 
damages by the body politic.
166
   
 
As seen, there is strong evidence for governing bodies to have standing to 
claim for damage done to the environment even in the absence of 
proprietary rights. However, whether private entities have the same right is 
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difficult to say, especially as in a number of jurisdictions living resources 
such as fish are “only subject to a qualified right of ownership.”167 
 
It has been suggested by Gauci that- 
[O]ne should not a priori exclude the right of an individual to 
protect the natural environment and it is suggested that future 
environmental legislation should specify that locus standi in these 
matters should not be dependent on proprietorial rights and that the 
award of damages should be assigned to a fund set up appositely for 
the restoration of environmental damages.
168
 
 
4.3 Quantification and Compensation 
Quantification of environmental damage is another issue relating to 
admissibility of claims.  
In 1979 the Antonio Gramsci grounded near Ventspils (former USSR) in the 
Baltic Sea. About 5,500 tonnes of crude oil was spilled, resulting in damage 
to the coastline of Sweden, Finland and the USSR. The claim put forward 
by the USSR for environmental damage was calculated with the so-called 
“Methodika” formula according to national legislation in the USSR.  
The damage assessed was at a rate of 2 Roubles per cubic meter of polluted 
water (estimated according to the quantity of the oil spilt). At the time the 
USSR was party to CLC but not to the Fund. The claim was rejected by the 
IOPC Fund, partly because the USSR was not party to the Fund but also 
because the damage was not considered to be “pollution damage” as defined 
by the Conventions. The case led the Fund to adopt a resolution in 1980 
stating that “the assessment of compensation to be paid by the International 
Oil Pollution Compensation Fund is not to be made on the basis of an 
abstract quantification of damage calculated in accordance with theoretical 
models.”169 
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In the case of Patmos the claimant was awarded an amount of Lit 2,100 
million (£861,000) but the judgment did not show how this was calculated.  
Experts appointed by the court used a model to assess the damage to fishing 
activities; however this model was only partly used by the court as the value 
of the environment was more than just fish, as natural resources have a 
value to the environment.
170
  
The claim was rejected by the Fund because it was non-economical 
environmental damage but since the award did not exceed the shipowner’s 
liability, the IOPC Fund did not have to pay any compensation and therefore 
was not entitled to appeal the decision of the court.
171
  
 
Following the Haven incident, the Italian Government claimed 
compensation for: 
Restoration of 43 hectares of phanerogams; Llt 266 042 million 
(£102 million); consequences of the beach erosion caused by 
damage to the phanerogams: not quantified but left to the 
assessment of the Court on the basis of equity; damage restored by 
the natural biologic recovery of the resources; Llt 591 364 million 
(£227 million) for the sea and LIt 6 029 million (£2.3 million) for 
the atmosphere, or a total of some £229 million; irreparable damages 
to the sea and atmosphere; not quantified but left to assessment by 
the Court on the basis of equity
172
 
The IOPC Fund rejected the claim on the basis that “claims relating to non-
quantifiable elements of damage to the environment could not be admitted” 
and that “compensation could only be granted if a claimant had suffered 
quantifiable economic loss.”173 
The court determined that the State of Italy was entitled to compensation for 
environmental damage. As the environmental damage could not be assessed 
according to a commercial or economic valuation, the court assessed the 
damage as a portion of the cleanup costs (approximately one-third) at a sum 
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of about £16.8 million.
174
 This amount would, in the view of the judge, 
represent the damage not made good by these operations.
175
 
The Fund rejected the decision of the court, stating that the judge had 
reached an “absurd conclusion that compensation for environmental damage 
increases with the increase of the cost of the clean-up operations.”176 
The Fund also objected to the decision because the provision in Italian 
statute applied by the judge, is not applicable in relation with the Fund since 
in that provision liability is based on negligence and the compensation must 
be assessed by the judge on the basis of the degree of the fault of the 
wrongdoer, the profit achieved by him and the cost necessary for the 
restoration of the environment.
177
 “The Fund has stated that according to 
Italian case law and legal doctrine, the compensation awarded under this Act 
has the nature of a sanction and the damage thus assessed is punitive.”178 
 
Eventually the claim was settled in 1999. It should be noted that in the 
agreement it explicitly says that “there is no right to compensation for 
environmental damage.”179  
 
In the Zoe Colocotroni case
180
  the court decided on a strange method of 
quantification. 
Plaintiffs' proven claim of damage to marine organisms covers an 
approximate area of about 20 acres in and around the West 
Mangrove. The surveys conducted by Plaintiffs reliably establish 
that there was a decline of approximately 4,605,486 organisms per 
acre as a direct result of the oil spill. This means that 92,109,720 
marine animals were killed by the COLOCOTRONI oil spill. The 
uncontradicted evidence establishes that there is a ready market with 
reference to biological supply laboratories, thus allowing a reliable 
calculation of the cost of replacing these organisms. The lowest 
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possible replacement cost figure is $.06 per animal, with many 
species selling from $1.00 to $4.50 per individual. Accepting the 
lowest replacement cost, and attaching damages only to the lost 
marine animals in the West Mangrove area, we find the damages 
caused by Defendants to amount to $5,526,583.20.
181
 
 
In the Court of Appeal, this method of quantification was dismissed. Instead 
the Court used the restoration cost method. 
…we think the appropriate primary standard for determining 
damages in a case such as this is the cost reasonably to be incurred 
by the sovereign or its designated agency to restore or rehabilitate 
the environment in the affected area to is pre-existing condition, or 
as close thereto as is feasible without grossly disproportionate 
expenditures. The focus in determining such a remedy should be on 
the steps a reasonable and prudent sovereign or agency would take 
to mitigate the harm done by the pollution, with attention to such 
factors as technical feasibility, harmful side effects, compatibility 
with or duplication of such regeneration as is naturally to be 
expected, and the extent to which efforts beyond a certain point 
would become either redundant or disproportionately expensive.
182
  
 
This method is more in line with the one established by the Fund. 
It should be noted that while in the CLC, compensation is only payable for 
reinstatement of the environment.
183
 By comparison, in the OPA 90 
compensation is payable for the following: 
(A) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the 
equivalent of, the damaged natural resources; (B) the diminution in 
value of those natural resources pending restoration.
184
 
As such, the OPA 90 covers a wider array of damages; unlike the CLC, 
even interim losses may be compensable.   
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5. PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 
One of the more controversial areas pertaining to compensation for oil 
pollution damage is that of pure economic losses. Deciding whether a 
claimant should be compensated or not for economic loss, can be quite a 
problematic matter. While many claims are for damage suffered directly, 
there are those where claims for losses sustained are “less” directly, in 
which the courts have to consider matters of causation, remoteness and 
proximity.
185
 
 
Claims for economic losses such as reductions in profits are frequently seen 
in relation to oil pollution incidents. Common claims are those of claimants 
involved in the fishing industry, e.g. fishermen suffering from reduced 
catches and reduced prices because of the public’s faith in the product has 
been damaged. Another industry where claims for financial loss are 
frequently seen is the tourist industry, e.g. owners of hotels and restaurants. 
 
The case of Hedley Byrne v. Heller and Partners
186
 is a leading case, 
although non-maritime, relating to compensation for economic loss. In 
Hedley Byrne, the plaintiffs (a firm of advertising agents) brought a claim 
against the defendants (a bank) for financial loss suffered by relying on 
statements made negligently by the defendants. In this case it was 
established that a pure economic loss can be recoverable outside of 
contracts.  
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest held- 
My Lords, I consider that it follows and that it should now be 
regarded as settled that if someone possessed of a special skill 
undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the 
assistance of another person who relies upon such skill, a duty of 
care will arise. The fact that the service is to be given by means of or 
by the instrumentality of words can make no difference. 
Furthermore, if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others 
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could reasonably rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his 
ability to make careful inquiry a person takes it upon himself to give 
information or advice to, or allows his information or advice to be 
passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will 
place reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.
187
 
 
The matter of “reasonable foreseeability” is a concept of law that came to 
carry over into maritime law and is along with remoteness/proximity and 
directness, the key factors in determining compensability of ship-source oil 
pollution damage.  
 
There are numerous varieties of economic loss, such as loss of profits, loss 
of income, loss of future income but a distinction has to be made between 
losses that are “pure economic losses”, meaning a loss “without antecedent 
harm to plaintiff’s person or property”188 and losses that are 
“consequential”, meaning that the loss is connected with damage to a 
proprietary interest.  
 
5.1 Consequential loss 
In common law jurisdictions, claims for pure economic loss are generally 
not compensable as it could “open the floodgates of litigation.”189  However, 
in some cases economic losses which are not truly “pure” in character are in 
certain cases recoverable.  
In Spartan Steel and Alloys Limited v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd
190
 
the concepts of consequential and pure economic loss were discussed. 
While digging up a road with a power-driven excavating shovel, men 
employed by the defendants, Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd., damaged a 
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cable, which the defendants knew supplied electricity from the Mechalls 
Power Station of the Midland Electricity Board direct to the Spartan Works, 
Birmingham. The plaintiffs, Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd., were the owners 
of the factory and they manufactured stainless steel alloys. 
The plaintiffs made a claim based on negligence since material in the 
furnace was damaged and depreciated in value. Their loss and damage 
totaled £2,535. That sum was made up of £368 for loss of value of the metal 
in the furnace at the time the electricity supply failed, £400 for loss of profit 
on that metal and £1,767 for loss of profit on four further melts which could 
have been carried out during the period that there was no electricity supply. 
In the Court of Appeal, the one melt (£368), and the loss of profit on that 
melt consequent thereon (£400) were recoverable but not the £1,767 
because that was as Lord Denning put it “economic loss independent of the 
physical damage.”191 
Edmund Davies L.J. did not agree with the judgment and stated that- 
For my part, I cannot see why the £400 loss of profit here sustained 
should be recoverable and not the £1,767. It is common ground that 
both types of loss were equally foreseeable and equally direct 
consequences of the defendants' admitted negligence, and the only 
distinction drawn is that the former figure represents the profit lost 
as a result of the physical damage done to the material in the furnace 
at the time when power was cut off.
192
 
 
Lord Denning held- 
Rather than expose claimants to such temptation and defendants to 
such hard labour - on comparatively small claims - it is better to 
disallow economic loss altogether, at any rate when it stands alone, 
independent of any physical damage. 
Consequential losses are generally compensable, assuming the claimant is 
the owner of the damaged property. This was the case in Weller & Co. v. 
Foot & Mouth Disease Research Institute.
193
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In the case there was an escape of virus from defendants' premises infecting 
cattle in vicinity with foot and mouth disease. Two cattle markets were 
consequently closed on order of the Minister of Agriculture, causing a loss 
of profits for the plaintiff auctioneers. The plaintiffs claimed against 
defendants alleging that, as the result of their negligence and/or breach of 
absolute duty in allowing escape of dangerous thing, plaintiffs suffered loss 
by closure of markets. It was held by Widjery, J. that- 
assuming in plaintiffs' favour, that their loss was foreseeable and 
that defendants' negligence caused escape of virus, that defendants' 
duty of care was owed to owners of cattle in neighbourhood and 
plaintiffs were not owners of cattle and did not have any proprietary 
interest in anything which might conceivably be damaged by virus if 
it escaped; that, even if plaintiffs had proprietary interest in market 
premises, those premises were not in jeopardy; and that, therefore, 
plaintiffs' claim in negligence failed.
194
 
 
This was further established in the case of Candlewood Navigation 
Corporation Ltd. v. Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd.(The Mineral Transporter)
195
 
where the plaintiff time charterer collided with the appellants vessel and 
claimed for recovery for the wasted hire under the terms of the charterparty 
and the loss of profits during the period while Ibaraki Maru (the time 
chartered ship) was unoperational. It was held in the Privy Council that- 
the general proposition was that a time charterer was not entitled to 
recover for pecuniary loss caused by damage by a third party to the 
chartered vessel because a time charterer had no proprietary or 
possessory right in the chartered vessel and his only right in relation 
to the vessel was contractual.
196
 
 
It is apparent that although common law courts have been hesitant in 
allowing recoverability for economic loss, if there is a proprietary interest 
invested in the damaged property, the claimant has a claim for 
recoverability.  
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5.2 Common law  
As seen above, the position in the UK has been that pure economic losses, 
unless consequential, are generally not compensable. However, with the 
decision in the Hedley Byrne
197
 the English courts have seen more inclined 
to admit claims for pure economic losses. One of the most important cases 
relating to pure economic loss is the non-maritime case of Junior Books Ltd. 
v. Veitchi
198
.  
The defenders, specialist flooring contractors, were engaged as sub-
contractors to lay a floor in a factory which was being erected for the 
pursuers (plaintiffs) by a building company. The pursuers claimed that the 
floor was defective due to negligence of the defenders and as a result of the 
floor cracking they had suffered loss and damage (including loss of profits). 
There was no contractual relationship between the pursuers and the 
defenders. It was held in the House of Lords: 
that where the relationship between the parties was sufficiently 
close, the scope of the duty of care in delict or tort owed by a person 
doing work was not limited to a duty to avoid causing foreseeable 
harm to persons or to property other than the subject-matter of the 
work by negligent acts or omissions, but extended to a duty to avoid 
causing pure economic loss consequential on defects in the work 
and …to avoid defects in the work itself, and that, on the assumption 
that the pursuers' averments were correct, they disclosed a sufficient 
degree of proximity to give rise to a duty of care.
199
 
It should be noted that in the case of Murphy v. Brentwood
200
, the House of 
Lords reversed its decision and held that Veitchi and the similar case of 
Anns v. London Borough of Merton
201
 were wrongly decided, and that the 
losses incurred in those cases were considered to be “pure economic loss” 
and therefore not recoverable.
202
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As such, there is a lack of uniformity in the decisions made by the House of 
Lords, causing uncertainty as to what kinds of economic losses are 
recoverable.  
 
In the Canadian case of Canadian National Railway Company v. Norsk 
Pacific Steamship Company Limited (The Jervis Crown)
203
 a barge being 
towed down the Fraser River by a tug owned by Norsk collided in heavy fog 
with the New Westminster railway bridge to which it caused extensive 
damage which closed the bridge for several weeks. The bridge formed part of 
the plaintiff’s (CNR) main line and connected with tracks and land owned by 
CNR on either side of the bridge, however CNR did not own the bridge but 
only used under a contract with Public Works Canada (PWC).  
The plaintiff sued the tug owners and operators for losses incurred in re-
routing their traffic and loss of profit for the time it took to repair the bridge.   
It was held by the Supreme Court of Canada by a 4:3 majority that the 
plaintiff’s claim should succeed. The Court expanded on liability for pure 
economic loss in the following words: 
Pure economic loss is prima facie recoverable where, in addition to 
negligence and foreseeable loss, there is sufficient proximity between 
the negligent act and the loss.  Proximity is the controlling concept, 
avoiding the spectre of unlimited liability.  Proximity may be 
established by a variety of factors depending on the nature of the 
case.  The categories are not closed and further definition as to what 
factors give rise to liability for pure economic loss will occur as more 
cases are decided.  In determining whether liability should be 
extended to a new situation, the courts should consider the factors 
traditionally relevant to proximity such as the relationship between 
the parties, physical propinquity, assumed or imposed obligations and 
close causal connection.  Sufficient special factors must exist to avoid 
the imposition of indeterminate and unreasonable liability.  The result 
would be a principled, yet flexible, approach to tort liability for pure 
economic loss.  Recovery would be allowed where justified, while 
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excluding indeterminate and inappropriate liability, and it will permit 
the coherent development of the law.
204
 
In Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works
205
 it was held- 
The breach of the duty to warn constituted negligence on the part of 
both respondents. The economic loss solely attributable to the 
interruption of the appellant's business during "coastal operations" 
was the immediate consequence of that breach and such damage was 
recoverable in an action for negligence. 
In the U.S, claims for pure economic losses have generally been declined as 
otherwise it would lead to "to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
206
 This can be exemplified by 
the case of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint
207
 where time charterers 
of the steamship Bjornefjord sued the Dry Dock Company for recovery for 
the loss of use of the steamer for two weeks. By the terms of the charter 
party the steamer was to be docked at least once in every six months, and 
payment of the hire was to be suspended until she was again in proper state 
for service. In accordance with these terms the vessel was delivered to the 
petitioner and docked, and while there the propeller was so injured by the 
petitioner's negligence that a new one had to be put in, thus causing the 
delay for which this suit is brought. 
The injury to the propeller was no wrong to the respondents but only 
to those to whom it belonged. But suppose that the respondent's loss 
flowed directly from that source. Their loss arose only through their 
contract with the owners-and while intentionally to bring about a 
breach of contract may give rise to a cause of action. … no authority 
need be cited to show that, as a general rule, at least, a tort to the 
person or property of one man does not make the tort-feasor liable to 
another merely because the injured person was under a contract with 
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that other unknown to the doer of the wrong. The law does not 
spread its protection so far.
208
 
There seems to be a lack of certainty regarding pure economic losses in 
common law jurisdictions and as such any general rule of when pure 
economic losses are compensable or not is difficult to ascertain. 
 
As most common law states are parties to the CLC/Fund (with the glaring 
exception of the U.S) discussion on cases of oil pollution can be seen in 
Chapter 5.5. 
 
5.3 Civil law  
Pure economic losses are naturally treated differently depending on the 
jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions can be regarded as liberal, e.g. France, while 
some can be regarded as conservative, e.g. Sweden.
209
 
In France traditionally, all claims for pure economic loss can generally be 
granted. Article 1382 of the Code Napoléon reads “Every action of man 
whatsoever which occasions injury to another, binds him through whose 
fault it happened to reparation thereof.” Article 1383 adds: “Everyone is 
responsible for the damage of which he is the cause, not only by his own 
act, but also by his negligence or by his imprudence.” 
As such, all losses are treated in the same way, no matter if they are what is 
in common law referred to as “pure economic loss” or not. Indeed, as put by 
Bussani and Palmer, “the expression ‘pure economic loss’ is virtually 
unknown.
210
 
 
In Sweden, a pure economic loss is described as an “economic loss arising 
without connection to anyone’s bodily injury or property damage.”211 
Further, “whoever causes pure economic loss through a crime shall 
compensate that injury.”212 It seems like pure economic losses are only 
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compensable if the damage is caused by a crime. However, this is not 
necessarily the case as there are exceptions to the general rule and at certain 
times, the court may decide that pure economic loss is compensable even if 
it is not caused by a crime
213
 which can be seen in case law.
214
 
As such, it seems like Sweden is moving towards a more liberal approach. 
 
5.4 The CLC/Fund Regime 
Although the IOPC Fund is an intergovernmental organisation that provides 
compensation for oil pollution damage its decisions and guidelines are not 
binding to parties.  However, it does provide a foundation for which states 
can use as criteria for when losses are compensable.   
The 1969 CLC defines pollution damage as: 
 loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by  
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the 
ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, and includes the 
costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures.
215
 
The definition does not give an answer to whether pure economic losses are 
compensable, instead leaving it to national courts to decide.  
In the 1984 Protocols and then consequently the 1992 CLC the definition 
changed to mean: 
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination 
resulting from escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever 
such escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation for 
impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such 
impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of 
reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken. 
 
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage 
caused by preventive measures. 
The definition includes loss of profit, but other than that economic loss is 
not mentioned.  
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The Fund has, at any rate, been somewhat liberal in allowing recovery. In 
one of the earlier cases concerning the Fund regarding the Tanio incident, 
compensation for loss of income of the tourist industry was compensable if 
it could be regarded as a direct result of the pollution.
216
 Owners of 
restaurant and hotels were compensated even though they might not have 
been situated very close to the beach.
217
 However, in the same case the Fund 
rejected a claim by the town of Cleder for loss of tax revenues due to 
reduction of income of businessmen as a result of the incident.
218
 
 
The Fund has allowed recovery for pure economic loss in cases where 
economic losses are suffered by persons who depend directly on earnings 
from coastal or sea-related activities, e.g. fishermen, owners of hotels and 
restaurants.
219
  
As claims for pure economic loss are admissible only if they are for loss or 
damage caused by contamination, the starting point is the pollution, not the 
incident itself.
220
 
 
In the 1990’s there were a rather large number of claims for economic loss 
as a consequence of the Haven, Aegean Sea and Braer incidents.  
The practice established by the Fund worked on a case-by-case basis, 
leaving the Fund without any real significant principle established, but with 
the large number of claims presented in relation to the above mentioned 
incidents, a clear definition was needed. 
The Fund has taken means to establish a sort of principle for compensability 
of economic loss, a working group was established where the following 
criteria were set out: 
 the geographic proximity between the claimant’s activity 
and the contamination; 
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 the degree to which the claimant was economically 
dependent on an affected resource; 
 the extent to which a claimant had alternative sources of 
supply or business opportunities; 
 the extent to which a claimant’s business formed an integral 
part of the economic activity within the area affected by the 
spill.
221
 
Further, claims for costs of measures to prevent pure economic loss may 
also be recoverable if the following criteria are met: 
 The cost of the measures should be reasonable.  
 The cost of the measures should not be disproportionate to 
the further damage or loss that they are intended to mitigate. 
 The measures should be appropriate and offer a reasonable 
prospect of being successful (for example, measures to 
restore confidence in seafood products should normally only 
be undertaken once fishing grounds are cleared of 
contamination and there is little or no risk of further 
contamination). 
 In the case of marketing campaigns, the measures should 
relate to actual targeted markets (for example, measures to 
counteract the negative effects on tourism in a particular 
area should normally be focused on the normal visitor client 
base of that area)
222
 
In the CMI guidelines on Oil Pollution Damage (1994) "Pure economic 
loss" means financial loss sustained by a claimant otherwise than as a result 
of such physical loss of or damage to property. The guidelines objective is 
to provide assistance to which claims are thought to be recoverable under 
the law as applied in the majority of countries. In the guidelines there is a 
provision for when pure economic loss may be compensated.
223
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Although there is in principle a test to decide recoverability, there has been 
inconsistency in the Fund’s decisions. A claim made by a sculptor for 
economic loss suffered as a result of a decline in the sales of his work due to 
the reduction of the tourism in the area was deemed recoverable by the Fund 
in the wake of the Erika disaster but in another incident the main ferry 
operator carrying tourists to the contaminated area (Shetlands) was not 
allowed by the fund to recover for its economic loss, which was the result of 
a decline in the number of tourists visiting the area.
224
 
 
A large number of claims for pure economic loss are related to fishing 
activities. Generally a claim for pure economic loss is accepted for 
compensation if there is a sufficiently close link of causation between the 
contamination and the loss or damage.
225
 
As a result of the Sea Empress incident, the Fund received claims from fish 
processing and sales companies located outside the area covered by the 
                                                                                                                            
6. (a) Pure economic loss will be treated as caused by contamination only when a 
reasonable degree of proximity exists between the contamination and the loss. 
(b) In ascertaining whether such proximity exists, account is to be taken of all the 
circumstances, including (but not limited to) the following general criteria: 
i. the geographic proximity between the claimant's activities and the contamination; 
ii. the degree to which the claimant is economically dependent on an affected natural 
resource; 
iii. the extent to which the claimant's business forms an integral part of economic activities 
in the areas which are directly affected by the contamination; 
iv. the scope available for the claimant to mitigate his loss; 
v. the foreseeability of the loss; and 
vi. the effect of any concurrent causes contributing to the claimant's loss. 
7. Whilst the result in practice of applying the foregoing general principles will always 
depend on the circumstances of the individual case, recovery will not normally extend -- 
a. to parties other than those who depend for their income on commercial exploitation of 
the affected coastal or marine environment, such as, for example, those involved in: 
i. fishing, aquaculture and similar industries; 
ii. the provision of tourist amenities such as hotels, restaurants, shops, beach facilities and 
related activities; 
iii. the operation of desalination plants, salt evaporation lagoons, power stations and similar 
installations reliant on the intake of water for production or cooling processes; 
b. [not] to parties claiming merely to have suffered; 
i. delay, interruption or other loss of business not involving commercial exploitation of the 
environment; 
ii. loss of taxes and similar revenues by public authorities. 
224
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fishing bans which had maintained that they had been deprived of their 
supply of shellfish as a result of the incident.
226
 
The Committee noted that, in the Director's view, the more fact that 
a claimant's activities were located slightly outside the area 
immediately affected by the spill should not, by itself, disqualify the 
claimant from compensation . The Committee further noted that the 
Director was of the view that the further away from the affected area 
that the claimant's business was located the greater the weight that 
would need to be given to the other criteria. 
 
The Executive Committee considered that as this processing plant 
was located close to the area covered by the fishing ban (80 
kilometers north by road), this claim fulfilled the criterion of 
geographic proximity between the claimant's activity and the 
contamination. It was further noted by the Committee that the 
claimant was highly dependent on the supplies from the area and 
that it had limited possibilities of obtaining supplies elsewhere. The 
Committee took the view that the claimant's business should be 
considered as forming an integral part of the economic activity of 
the area. For these reasons, the Committee was of the opinion that 
there was a reasonable degree of proximity between the 
contamination and the alleged loss, and decided that this claim was 
admissible in principle.
227
 
 
In regards to the principle set out in the claims manual Professor Soyer 
stated that- 
The admissibility criteria should simply be viewed as a formulation 
developed by the fund in order to assist in the consideration of the 
claims submitted. There is no doubt that the criteria have 
implications for the fund, but one should not lose sight of the fact 
that the decisions of the fund are themselves subject to the judicial 
control of the courts in member jurisdictions.
228
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It is important to bear in mind that the so called “fund jurisprudence” 
consisting of the criteria set out in the claims manual and decisions by the 
Fund is not legally binding.  
As Lord Cullen held in Landcatch Ltd. v. International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund- 
The answer to the main issue under discussion depends on the 
interpretation of s. 1 of the 1971 Act. I do not consider that it is 
proper or appropriate to treat the criteria and decisions of the Fund 
as an aid to the construction of the legislation. It is conceded that 
they have no binding effect on the Fund and that they were not to be 
treated as authorities so far as this Court is concerned. They do not 
have the status of an international agreement for the interpretation of 
a Convention. They are no more than indications of the Fund’s 
response to certain types of claims. Whether or not the criteria or 
decisions were well-founded on an interpretation of the Convention 
is a matter that is neither here nor there so far as the present case is 
concerned. The Fund rejected the claim by Landcatch with which 
the present actions are concerned. It appears to me to be an entirely 
improper exercise to divert the Court from seeking a proper 
statutory interpretation by submitting that assistance can be gained 
by considering whether rejection of Landcatch’s claim was 
inconsistent with the criteria adopted by a party.
229
 
 
As the Fund is a legal entity and therefore party to the proceedings it is 
questionable how much the courts can base their decisions on the Fund’s 
criteria. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties-  
 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
230
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Whether the “Fund jurisprudence” is such as to be effected by the Vienna 
Convention is doubtful as it is rarely referred to as an agreement of that 
kind, but in any case it seems that although not binding, most courts seem to 
uphold the decisions made by the Fund.
231
  
 
5.4.1 Decisions of national courts 
As seen above, national courts do not seem to recognize the Fund’s criteria 
to be legally binding. Although they may view them as a reference or 
assistance, they have their own interpretation of the Conventions. 
5.4.1.1 Civil law  
The civil law approach leaves much to the court’s discretion in the specific 
case.  As seen above, France for example is generally liberal in allowing 
recovery for pure economic loss. 
 
On 12 December 1999 the Maltese-registered Tanker Erika (19 666 GT) 
broke in two in the Bay of Biscay, some 60 nautical miles off the coast of 
Brittany, France, some 19 800 tonnes of oil were spilled at the time of the 
incident. There were many claims for compensation for pure economic loss 
relating to the incident. A tour operator in the U.K. specialising in selling 
holidays in various European countries submitted a claim for pure economic 
loss.  
In the Commercial Court in Rennes a claim was accepted for loss of income 
by a student who, unlike in 1998 and 1999, had not been employed in the 
summer of 2000 at a camping site in Névez, Department of Finistère.  
As this claim involved a matter of principle the Executive Committee of the 
IOPC Fund instructed the Secretariat to appeal against the judgment. In the 
Court of Appeal in Rennes, the Fund’s appeal was accepted and the Court 
reversed the first instance judgment and rejected the claim.  
The Court stated that the criteria for the admissibility of claims 
contained in the Claims Manual could not be assimilated to 
agreements between the parties in the sense of Article 31.3 of 
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties nor to international 
custom in the sense of the same Vienna Convention. The Court also 
stated that it was for the national courts to decide the interpretation 
of the term ‘pollution damage’, but that in doing so they should take 
into account the terms of the 1992 Conventions, which by virtue of 
the French Constitution had a higher value than internal law, and 
that the criteria for the admissibility of claims, in particular the 
criterion not to compensate ‘second degree’ tourism claims, was 
internal to the Fund. The Court stated that the student who was 
employed in August 2000 had not shown that he had not been 
employed in July 2000 as a consequence of the reduction in tourism 
resulting from the Erika incident and had not provided evidence that 
he had attempted to obtain employment elsewhere.
232
 
 
The same line of reasoning can be seen in the Commercial Court in Lorient 
where the Fund had rejected a claim from the owner of a restaurant based on 
losses in 2001 (but accepted the claim based on losses in 2000) since there 
was not a sufficient link of causation between the claimed losses in 2001 
and the Erika incident. 
In a judgement rendered in July 2007 the Court stated that it was not 
bound by the Fund’s criteria for the admissibility of claims and that 
it was for the Court to interpret the concept of ‘pollution damage’ in 
the 1992 Conventions and to apply it in each individual case by 
determining whether there was a sufficient link of causation between 
the event and the damage. The Court considered that the Erika 
incident had not had a significant impact on the 2001 tourism season 
since, according to studies carried out, the results of 2001 were the 
consequence of factors unrelated to the oil spill. The Court therefore 
adopted the Fund’s views on the absence of a link of causation and 
held that the claimant had not proved that he had suffered losses 
beyond the loss of income assessed by the Fund.
233
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5.4.1.2 Common Law 
Courts in common law countries have in general been more hesitant to 
allow recovery for pure economic loss. As seen in the Veitchi case
234
, a 
special relationship is required for recoverability to be allowed for losses 
that are not consequential.  
In the 1990’s, United Kingdom courts were forced to deal with 
compensation for pure economic loss on several occasions.  
In the case of Landcatch v. IOPCF and Braer the pursuer’s business was to 
rear salmon from eggs to smolt in freshwater conditions and then to sell 
them for growing to maturity in seawater conditions. Their principal place 
of business was at Ormsary Argyll, which was about 500 kilometres distant 
from Shetland.
235
 Braer grounded off the coast of Shetland and 84,700 
tonnes of crude oil and 1600 tonnes of bulk fuel oil escaped or were 
discharged. An area which could be affected by oil or other chemical 
substances which were likely to create a hazard to human health if fish or 
shellfish drawn from within the area were consumed was designated by the 
Scottish State. That order was replaced by an order of Jan. 17, 1993 which 
enlarged the designated area or exclusion zone to about 400 square miles. 
The pursuers contended that as a result of the oil pollution and the exclusion 
zone designation they suffered losses namely (1) smolt culled because of the 
lack of sales; (2) reduced selling price of smolt sold in 1993 and in 1994 
when prices had not resumed their normal level; (3) additional rearing costs 
incurred in making special arrangements for on-growing 260,000 smolt; and 
(4) “expenses in pursuing claim”.236 The claim was rejected237 as the 
pursuers had not proved the necessary proximity:  
“I conclude therefore that while the fact that these are claims 
for economic loss is not sufficient per se to exclude them, the 
statutory liabilities on which they are founded are not 
indeterminate in extent. In the context of these sections the 
liability for pure economic loss can be satisfactorily 
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interpreted to mean a liability for such loss where it is directly 
caused by the contamination in accordance with established 
principles of law. It is therefore for the pursuers to aver and 
prove that the necessary proximity exists between the parties 
in order to bring themselves within the category of cases in 
which such losses are recoverable.” “I therefore reject the first 
submission for the pursuers.”238 
 
The case was appealed to the Inner House Second Division of the Court of 
Session. Landcatch claimed that causation should be based on the “but for” 
test
239
 in cases of pure economic loss. This was rejected by the court  
…if Landcatch’s “but for” construction of causation is correct it 
opens up a limitless chain of claims as the implications of ever more 
remote effects are worked out.
240
 
Lord Cullen held: 
I have no difficulty in accepting that the mere fact that the 
expression “loss” is apt to include claims of pure economic loss in 
the context of this legislation does not entail that every claim for 
pure economic loss is admissible. That is clearly so where, as in this 
case, the claim is of a secondary or relational type. 
 
In these circumstances I consider that “loss”, as included in 
“damage” for the purposes of s. 1(1) of the 1971 Act, does not cover 
secondary or relational claims.
241
 
Lord McCluskey did a comparison between a fisherman whose livelihood is 
earned fishing in particular waters and a trader who regularly supplies him 
with the diesel and the nets.  
That loss of prospective profit is pure economic loss. In a figurative 
sense what he has in the waters is a direct economic interest. That 
interest is directly affected by the contamination. 
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The trader’s loss of profit, which begins to occur when his expected 
sales do not eventuate, is essentially relational loss. It is, of course, 
pure economic loss; but it is not that which is important; what is 
important is that it is not a loss that is caused directly by 
contamination.
242
 
 
Eventually it was held that their (Landcatch) claim for pure economic loss is 
seen to be unquestionably relational, indirect and remote.
243
 
 
In February, 1996 the Sea Empress grounded off Milford Haven and 72,000 
tonnes of crude oil spilled into the sea. The spillage led to the imposition of 
a fishing ban pursuant to Part 1 of the Food and Environment Pollution Act, 
1985. The claimant Tilbury was a company engaged in the business of fish 
processing. Tilbury had supply contracts with fishermen who fished the 
whelk ground between Tenby and Saundersfoot landing their catch in the 
Milford Haven. As a result of the fishing ban Tilbury claimed to have lost 
the profit that it would have made from processing whelks supplied by the 
fishermen.  
In the Queen’s Bench, David Steel, J. held: 
that (1) the causative link between the escape of oil and the loss of 
profitable sales of processed whelks was unconnected with, let 
alone, interrupted by any fresh or intervening cause; the loss would 
not have been sustained but for a range of other factors such as the 
contracts with the fishermen, the absence of an alternative source of 
whelks; but these pre-existing factors were simply the circumstances 
in which the escape could occasion the loss; the escape was the only 
legally effective cause of the loss 
(2) it was common ground that the loss sustained by the claimants 
was foreseeable 
(3) the processors claim was secondary derivative relational and/or 
indirect; and this lack of proximity rendered the claim too remote; 
the claim failed
244
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I am fully persuaded that, as the Fund contended, this claim must 
fail for the same reasons as those in Landcatch. 
245
 
In the Court of Appeal, the decision by Justice Steel was upheld, affirming 
that relational or secondary losses are non recoverable. 
[T]he appellant was not engaged in any local activity in the physical 
area of contamination; its interest was in landed whelks not in the 
whelks in their natural habitat; the contamination had prevented the 
fishermen, whose physical activities were closely affected by the 
contamination of the waters and of whelks, from supplying the 
appellants with the landed whelks for which it had contracted; the 
appellants’ resulting loss arose from its inability to carry out 
processing and packing and deliveries of processed and packed 
whelks far from the contaminated area; this was a term of secondary 
economic loss which was outside the intended scope of a statute 
which was closely focused on physical contamination and its 
consequences.
246
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6. CONCLUSION 
Since the Torrey Canyon much has happened in the field of liability and 
compensation for oil pollution damage. The strict liability regime set out in 
the conventions, although controversial at the time, seems the best way to 
ensure adequate compensation; in fact, anything other than strict liability 
would be almost unthinkable today. As both the Bunkers Convention and 
the HNS Convention (and later Protocol) are largely based on the CLC and 
considering the number of states party to the CLC, there is no doubt that it 
has accomplished much of what it set out to do, that is “to ensure that 
adequate compensation is available to persons who suffer damage caused by 
pollution resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from ships.”247 
Undoubtedly the victim today has a better case for obtaining compensation 
from oil pollution damage than he did 50-60 years ago.  
 
There is however still some question marks in the current regime for oil 
pollution damage. The very limited definition of “pollution damage” in the 
conventions is a cause for concern. Whilst defining environmental damage 
might prove difficult as the environment is such an amorphous object, not 
dealing with subjects like standing is indeed questionable. It seems that the 
legislators’ intentions are to leave these matters to the national courts to 
decide, causing uncertainty as to when a claim will be compensated.  
 
Further, compensation for environmental damage is only admissible for 
impairment of the environment, limited to costs of reasonable measures of 
reinstatement. There is an issue regarding when impairment is such that a 
reasonable measure of reinstatement is necessitated and what is the 
threshold for “reasonableness”. If an action of reinstatement is not deemed 
as reasonable, restoration measures might not be taken at all. This could be 
dire as some measures are simply not technically feasible or the costs for 
restoration will be too high. This could lead to further damage to the 
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environment and also possibly affect the liability of the polluter or at least 
reduce the total amount of compensation. This would certainly work against 
the interest of “making the polluter pay”. 
 
The Fund has on several occasions been at odds with national courts when 
dealing with environmental damage, standing (locus standi) and 
quantification. While some courts have been inclined to award 
compensation for damage to the environment per se, the Fund is of the 
opinion that “there is no right to compensation for environmental damage.” 
 
As seen above, it has been said that a uniform interpretation of the definition 
of pollution damage is essential as it could otherwise lead to unfairness. It is 
in the opinion of this author questionable whether the new regime has in fact 
succeeded in constructing a definition of “pollution damage” that gives 
certainty and a uniform treatment. The issue of standing has been entirely 
left out of the CLC/Fund. Standing is based on a proprietary interest vested 
in the damage suffered. As such, there is no real issue where the damage is 
done to property or resources subject to ownership. However, when there is 
no clear proprietary interest involved, e.g. if the damaged property belongs 
to no one in particular. Where states have solved this by e.g. the doctrines of 
public trust or parens patriae as in the U.S. there is not much of an issue but 
this is not always the case. By comparison, the OPA 90 covers a wider array 
of damages, and as such, in respect of environmental damage, it offers 
victims more options for obtaining compensation. While evidently the 
legislators of the CLC/Fund has taken the approach to leave certain issues, 
such as standing, to the discretion of national courts; it would for the sake of 
uniformity and ensuring compensation, in the opinion of this author, have 
been preferable to give “environmental damage” a more detailed definition.  
 
Another issue pertaining to the definition of “pollution damage” in the 
conventions is that of “pure economic loss.” 
The position taken in the CLC/Fund regime concerning pure economic loss 
can again be said to be flexible, affording national courts freedom to 
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interpret the Conventions in their own way. Determining whether a loss is 
compensable or not, the courts look at remoteness/proximity, 
reasonableness and directness of the loss. This is certainly in line with the 
guidelines set out by the Fund, although the Fund seems to put more 
emphasis on if the claimant is economically dependent on an affected 
resource, the extent to which the claimant’s business forms an integral part 
of the economic activity within the area affected by the spill and alternative 
sources of supply and business opportunities.  
 
Indeed, in regards to pure economic loss it seems that often courts follow 
the so called “fund jurisprudence”, although not legally bound by it, as 
many judges adamantly hold. The biggest difference between common law 
jurisdictions and the Fund’s decisions is probably concerning claims  
relating to relational or secondary losses which are often accepted by the 
Fund but are generally not considered to be recoverable in common law 
jurisdictions. Civil law courts are in contrast more inclined to treat “pure 
economic losses” as any other loss, causing a discrepancy between different 
jurisdictions. Considering the inconsistency in the decisions of the Fund and 
the different views of common law and civil law jurisdictions a conclusive 
formula of when “pure economic losses” are compensable is virtually 
impossible. It is therefore questionable to give the so-called “fund 
jurisprudence” too much credence.  
 
Although Bunkers has not been the focus point of this thesis, it is an 
important Convention to fill the gap left in the international regime of oil 
pollution damage. There are some peculiarities in Bunkers in that there is in 
the Convention no basis for limitation of liability. There is also no fund 
dedicated to oil pollution damage caused by bunker oil. This is in the 
opinion of this author, a questionable choice by the legislators as this means 
that claimants for oil pollution damage will have to compete with non 
pollution claims subject to limitation of liability under national law. 
Considering e.g. the LLMC does not expressly give the right to limit 
liability for oil pollution damage and limits may differ a lot between 
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different states, it causes uncertainty and uniformity as to when you can 
limit your liability. Bunker oil pollution can be very costly and in 
jurisdictions where the limit is very low it is not at all unlikely that 
compensation will be inadequate.  
 
The issues this thesis has focused on can largely be attributed to the 
definition of “pollution damage” in the Conventions. This has in much been 
a conscious approach taken by the legislators leading to a lack of uniformity 
when dealing with oil pollution damage. In order to achieve harmonization 
and certainty in cases of oil pollution damage, the definition needs to be 
revised. 
 
However, it should be said that while the regime of liability for oil pollution 
damage is far from perfect; the work done throughout the last 40 or so years 
in not only legislation but also through guidelines, decisions and so on, 
today victims of oil pollution damage have indisputably stronger means of 
obtaining compensation. 
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